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THE SHORT AND PUZZLING LIFE OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM

CAMPBELL CROCKETT

Not too long ago philosophers often were accosted by individuals who demanded to know whether they were speaking meaningfully or metaphysically; and, if the former, whether cognitively or emotively; and, if cognitively, whether analytically or synthetically. These philosophers called themselves, and were called by others, such interesting names as "logical positivists," "logical empiricists," "scientific empiricists," "physicalists," "logical analysts," and "analytic empiricists." On the behalf of simplicity and clarity, I shall use the single phrase "logical positivists" throughout this essay as the name for these individuals. In many cases the intimidating procedures practised by these philosophers proved to be most effective, and some felt that the interrogators had discovered a new, exciting, and successful way of doing philosophy. Our interrogators shared this feeling, and Moritz Schlick went so far as to say:

> It appears that by establishing the natural boundaries of philosophy we unexpectedly acquire a profound insight into its problems; we see them under a new aspect which provides

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> us with the means of settling all so-called philosophical disputes in an absolutely final and ultimate manner.[1]

Today, however, philosophers are only slightly disturbed by the spasmodic and infrequent fire of the remaining logical positivists, reserving most of their strength to meet the persisting claims of the Cambridge analysts that they are in drastic need of therapy. Whereas the injunction to speak meaningfully rather than metaphysically occasionally may induce a mild state of neurosis in some of us, the sympathetic plea that we explicate the use or uses of our linguistic expressions frequently is followed by schizoid behavior.

We may wonder, then, why logical positivism, a newcomer to philosophical ranks, has become ineffective so rapidly. Joergensen has said that for philosophers to return to past ways of thinking, ignoring the contributions of logical positivism, would be as impracticable as for physicists to ignore the quantum theory.[2] I shall not comment on the question of the appropriateness of this analogy, but it is true that the present-day philosopher is obliged to consider the phenomenon of logical positivism. Victor Kraft's *The Vienna Circle*[3] is an addition to the literature on this subject, and it contains some clues which may enable us to see why positivism has so declined in the past fifteen years that the species is in danger of becoming extinct.

Kraft is a historian, a member of the Vienna Circle, and the successor of Moritz Schlick, the founder of the Circle, at the University of Vienna. Kraft tells us that the main purpose of the book is to "put the fundamental ideas of this movement before the eyes of contemporary German philosophers, who are not sufficiently familiar with them."[4] If the English-reading philosopher compares this study with others available to him, I suggest that he will find it a little disappointing. It does not possess the close scholarship and incisive analysis characteristic of Julius Weinberg's study.[5] The clear and accurate reporting found in Joergen Joergensen's monograph[6] is lacking in Kraft's poorly organized work. And certainly the richness and creativeness of Richard von Mises's book[7] is missing. Moreover, Kraft

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[1]"The Future of Philosophy," *Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, Oxford, 1930* (Oxford, 1931), p. 112.

[2]Joergen Joergensen, *The Development of Logical Empiricism* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 86.

[3]New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953.

[4]*The Vienna Circle*, p. vii.

[5]*An Examination of Logical Positivism* (London, 1936).

[6]*Development of Logical Empiricism.*

[7]*Positivism* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951).

is excessively dependent upon the writings of Carnap and does not explicate satisfactorily the ideas of Wittgenstein, Schlick, and Neurath, among others. Nonetheless, the book carries a tone of authority since its author was a member of the Circle. Kraft's contribution to this literature, although not especially illuminating, prompts one to take fresh stock of its subject matter. What I now propose to do is to consider a few of the reasons why the philosophy of the Vienna Circle seems to me to be inadequate.

I

The Vienna Circle, Kraft informs us, held that linguistic analysis forms the proper domain of the logic of science.[8] Schlick argues that contemporary philosophers must attend to language:

> The whole history of philosophy might have taken a very different course if the minds of the great thinkers had been more deeply impressed by the remarkable fact that there is such a thing as language.[9]

The positivists were vigorously opposed to the ambiguity, vagueness, and multivocality characteristic of ordinary language and claimed that symbolic logic led to "a degree of clarity and rigor which is unattainable within ordinary language."[10] This emphasis upon the study of language and, more specifically, upon the development of "ideal languages" culminated in Carnap's claim that all philosophical problems occur on a syntactical level.

A

Philosophers for a long, long time have been deeply impressed by language. The *Cratylus* and *Euthydemus* of Plato, the logical writings of Aristotle, the linguistic studies of Abelard, Ockham, Hobbes, and Locke constitute a minute portion of the evidence for this assertion.

B

The evidence that I have offered is so widely available that surely I have missed the point. Carnap and Schlick certainly know that

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[8] *The Vienna Circle*, p. 27.

[9] *Gesammelte Aufsatze*, 1926-36 (Vienna, 1938), p. 153 (as quoted in Max Black's *Language and Philosophy* [Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press], p. 142).

[10] *The Vienna Circle*, p. 18.

their philosophical predecessors have studied language. What they mean to say, in part, is that philosophers should have realized more clearly the serious inadequacies of ordinary language. One way to circumvent these inadequacies is to work with linguistic models and construct "ideal languages."

Unless we are to assume that prepositivistic philosophers were incredibly obtuse, we must grant that they realized that the "linguistic rules" governing "moves" in geometry were more precise than the "rules," such as they are, governing casual after-dinner conversation. This realization, however, does not involve the belief that the procedures appropriate to geometry are applicable to ordinary discourse. Some of the positivists have been major figures in the development of symbolic logic, and the development of symbolic logic is an important accomplishment; but the application of this logic to language, including ordinary language, can lead to distortion and error. The persistent demand, for example, that traditional logicians specify whether universal categorical propositions (*A* and *E*) assert or do not assert existence, is a consequence of this misleading insistence that ordinary language behave as though it were a calculus. The looseness and malleability of ordinary language is simultaneously a source of ambiguity and error and an occasion of flexibility and progression. It is ironic that the philosophers who insist that we study language fail to attend to the biological features of language; they seem not to be aware of the subtle and complex differentiations of usage that characterize our linguistic habits.

C

Finally, this emphasis upon language led to Carnap's magician act: ontological problems vanish via the transition from the "material" to the "formal" mode of speech.

> All such pseudo-questions disappear once we employ the formal instead of the material mode of speech, by using, that is, corresponding syntactic words (numerical expression, spatial coordinate, predicate) in place of universal words (number, space, universal).[11]

Even Kraft, who is not generally a vigorous critic of the Vienna Circle, objects to this dissolution of philosophical problems as a "dodge."[12]

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[11] *Die logische Syntax der Sprache* (Vienna: J. Springer, 1934), p. 238.
[12] *The Vienna Circle*, p. 80.

II

All logical positivists, despite their differences, insist that all synthetic knowledge comes from "experience" and it only remains to determine what is meant by "experience." Morris Cohen has told us that the term "experience" in John Dewey's philosophy serves little function other than to carry the faint aroma of praise.[13] Does the term "experience" (to speak in the mode) serve a "cognitive" or an "emotive" function for the positivist?

At one point, Kraft equates "experience" with a "series of impressions."[14] Elsewhere he says:

> One can point only at something which is immediately given, and thus only at what is perceivable. In this way, what assertions can possibly mean is tied to experience, there can be no super-empirical meaning.[15]

We are not, however, to think of experience in the context of traditional empiricism and positivism. Logical positivists emphasize the plurality and connectedness of experience. That, perhaps, is why they say that visual and auditory perceptions represent similarity relations between positions of the stream of experience: "It is the continuous stream of experiences, ever changing, which is primordial."[16]

My first inclination is to say that this conception of experience represents an advance over the empiricisms of such philosophers as Mach and Hume. Those of us who persistently saw trees and books (or so we thought) could never adjust ourselves to a universe in which we saw "qualia" or "data" but never objects.

My second inclination, however, is to say something entirely different; namely, that this conception of experience does not represent an advance over anything at all. I find it very difficult to imagine a field or area from which I take slices in the form, for instance, of sense data, cognitions of objects, cognitions of other minds. Of course, one's experiences do change, and it is perfectly appropriate to speak of the "flow of experience" provided one knows a metaphor when he sees one.

Perhaps, however, I am misinterpreting Carnap's theory. Maybe he is not giving a genetic account of what is given to individuals in the development of knowledge. Maybe his theory has no psychological implications whatever. If not, then he is using, and Kraft is using,

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[13] *Reason and Nature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931).
[14] *The Vienna Circle*, p. 20.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

very misleading language, since what they say suggests that they *are* giving an account of human experience. And if they are not giving an account of human experience, then I am totally unable to understand what they are trying to do. It is interesting to note that whereas Carnap took the "stream of experiences" as the immediately given, Neurath assigned that role to "physical situations." Kraft comments, "What thus remained uncertain was just the foundations of empirical knowledge."[17] Kraft does not seem to be particularly disturbed by this dispute, but I should think that disagreement over the foundations of empirical knowledge might be rather serious for an empiricist. Indeed, if I announce that I am an empiricist but that I am uncertain as to the foundations of empirical knowledge, I do not know what I have announced.

III

Carnap has said that philosophy is the logic of science and that the proper domain of the logic of science is linguistic analysis. The point, then, of his constitution theory set forth in *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* is to show that statements made in an everyday realistic language and in scientific language can be replaced by statements made in the "elementary experience" language. This "translation," it is claimed, is accomplished by unimpeachable logical procedures. Kraft explains that Weinberg has demonstrated Carnap's failure to make the "translation."[18] I am concerned, though, with a different question; that is, what Carnap was trying to do. The title of the book plus the empiricist bent of the author suggest that he believed logic and immediate experience furnished the materials necessary to, and sufficient for, a conceptual construction of the world. A "thing" language, therefore, is theoretically dispensable, and the theory that substances have ontological status is in error. Such a phenomenalistic metaphysics is perfectly understandable, whatever may be the arguments for and against it. I confess that I do not find all philosophical theories with which I disagree "puzzling."

But we must remember that for Carnap and his fellow positivists, to speak metaphysically is to speak nonsensically; and Carnap speaks at times as though his theory of constitution had nothing whatever to do with the ultimate furniture of the universe. After all, he is practising linguistic analysis; and perhaps the point of *Der logische*

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 118.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

Aufbau der Welt is to show, if possible, that a certain group of uninterpreted symbols and a certain number of formation and transformation rules yield another group of uninterpreted symbols. If so, Carnap's choice of title must be regarded as his little joke. No one has any philosophical basis for objecting to the invention of this game, for the game is not a philosophical one. I am by no means certain that this interpretation of Carnap's work is correct, but neither can I be certain that it is incorrect. What is certain is that *some* of the things that Carnap says are compatible with and suggest this interpretation. I have the same kind of difficulty with Nelson Goodman's *The Structure of Experience*.[19] On the other hand, Bertrand Russell makes it perfectly clear in *Human Knowledge*[20] that *he* wants to find out what items are needed, in addition to sense data and logical procedures, to provide a philosophical description of the universe. Now I do not know whether one should try to describe the universe or whether one should play games in which marks are arranged according to certain rules; but I do know that one should decide which of these vastly different kinds of activities one is engaged in and inform the reader accordingly. And if one is going to make philosophical claims, one should be prepared to receive philosophical criticisms and should not restrain criticisms by pleading that one's marks remain uninterpreted.

"Analytic philosophers" dominate the present philosophical scene, and most of them have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by the Vienna Circle which Kraft describes. The ambiguity which I have tried to explain is flourishing under their direction. There are some who would say that we should return to traditional ways of doing philosophy, but I find this statement misleading. The analysis of linguistic usages has always been an important phase of philosophy. The belief that we should "apprehend reality" and then choose languages in which to report these "apprehensions" is certain to lead to bad philosophy. The function of the philosopher is not to list the items in the universe as one might list the objects in a room. The universe is not a huge urn containing counters of different shapes and sizes, and language is not a collection of names. Language and reality are indissolubly bound together, and it is often more effective to inquire into the circumstances under which a linguistic expression is uttered than to ask what the expression refers to.

For the philosopher, there should be a point to the study of uses

[19]Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951.
[20]New York: Simon & Schuster, 1948.

of linguistic expressions. John Wisdom, a skilled practitioner of "linguistic philosophy," believes that the purpose of philosophy is to provide "insights" or "illuminations." What do we see into? What is illuminated?

> The point of philosophical statements is peculiar. It is the illumination of the ultimate structure of facts, i.e., the relations between different categories of being. . . .[21]

What logical positivists and other "linguistic philosophers" often forget is the point of their investigations. Nonetheless, we should not throw away the instrument merely because it has been misused.

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[21] *Philosophy and Psycho-analysis* (New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953), p. 37.

THE LOGICAL STATUS OF CONTRADICTION

Richard L. Barber

The principle of noncontradiction is an explicit element of every logical system. I do not here deal with unsystematic logics; it might possibly be argued that there could be a mode of thought laying legitimate claim to the name of logic which did not embrace or endorse this principle; but such a mode of thought could scarcely claim to be a system in the absence of assured consistency.

The logic of Aristotle states explicitly that a predicate may not be both affirmed and denied of the same subject in the same sense; it also states that of any given proposition or predication it may not be both true and false, and must, of course, be one or the other.[1] In the modern formulations of Boolean algebras it is an indispensable principle that the conjunction of any class and its negate is empty[2] and indeed again that (by definition) the sum or alternation of any class and its negate must be equivalent to the universe class. In the propositional calculus of the *Principia Mathematica*, the principle of noncontradiction is offered as a theorem rather than as an axiom (*3.24 $\vdash : \sim(p. \sim p)$ (Asserted: not (P. not-P).[3] This is, of course, simply an assertoric categorical proposition, as indeed must all such assertions

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[1] *Categories* x, 13b1-35, esp. 26-35.

[2] George Boole, *Laws of Thought*, Vol. II of *The Logical Works of George Boole* (2 vols. La Salle, Ill., Open Court Pub. Co.), p. 86; and C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *Symbolic Logic* (New York, Dover Pubns.) p. 30, Th. 2.5.

[3] A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, *Principia Mathematica* (3 vols. Cambridge, Univ. Press), Vol. I, Theorem *3.24. The authors add, "The law of contradiction . . . is proved in this number; but in spite of its fame we have found few occasions for its use."

be in the system of material implication; but in system S1 of C. I. Lewis, which is represented as being an intentional logic and which defines strict implication in terms of negation and possibility or logical consistency, we have as theorem 18.8 (not possible P and non-P) $(\sim \Diamond (p. \sim p))$[4] which bears a stricter resemblance to the implicitly modal formulation of the traditional logic.

The difference between expressing this, or any other principle, as an axiom, postulate, or definition on the one hand and as a theorem on the other hand may be dealt with briefly in the present paper, although it is, of course, in its own domain a subject of considerable interest. Here it need only be remarked that in any formal system such as either Russell and Whitehead's system of material implication or Lewis's systems of strict implication, any theorem may be regarded as simply an explicit articulation of some assertion that was already implicit in the conjunction of the axioms, the definitions, and the rules of inference. Thus it is as much an "element" of the system as any primitive idea or postulate.

Further, it has been argued, and I think successfully, that even a system which claims to "prove" the principle of noncontradiction as a theorem must in fact have assumed the principle either as an implicit axiom ($\sim (p. \sim p)$) or as an implicit rule of inference ($p \dashv . \sim (\sim p)$), if not within the system of logic itself, then as part of the meta-logic which grounds or justifies the logical system as a whole. Both of these views, I think, are correct; but either one of them would sufficiently substantiate the assertion upon which the argument of this paper is based.

Even in logics which call themselves "unconventional" and offer us a third, or intermediate, value between truth and falsity or yet a larger number of "truth-values," we will not find any joint assertion of two exclusive predicates or categories or of two incompatible propositions.

It would then seem a fair question and, for philosophers, not an unlikely one, to ask *why* all this should be true; and indeed many logicians, in answer to this question, expressed or implied, have attempted a variety of explanations. First, and on the very face of the matter, we have been reminded that if, for example, the assertion of one proposition, P, were not to preclude any possible or actual conjoint assertion of its negate, not-P, it would have been very little use to assert P in the first place. (*Principia Mathematica*'s *4.13 $\vdash . p \equiv \sim$

[4]Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, p. 166. Its successor, 18.81 $\sim \Diamond \sim (p \vee \sim p)$ is Excluded Middle.

$(\sim p)$ [called "double negation" by Russell and Whitehead].)

Of equal persuasiveness to the systematic mind, and ultimately of far greater force, is the argument from what we might call the infectiousness of inconsistency; admit one contradiction, we shall be told, and we open the floodgates to an unlimited multitude of them. This attitude is formalized in the proposition of the *Principia* which tells us that if P is false then the assertion of P as an antecedent will materially imply Q, where Q is any proposition whatever $(\sim p . \supset . p \supset q)$.[5] In the modal or intentional logic of strict implication, the analogous formula is 19.74, "not possible P strictly implies that P strictly implies Q," $(\sim \Diamond p) \dashv (p \dashv q)$[6] where again Q is unrestricted. A perhaps even more impressive expression of this state of affairs is given in theorem 19.72, "not possible P implies that P implies not-Q as well as Q" $(\sim \Diamond p) \dashv (p \dashv q) . (p \dashv \sim q)$.[7] Within, then, the more extensively developed formal systems we will find the argument from infectiousness well articulated. But, while this argument is persuasive in its own way, it fails really to give any final or ultimate answer to our original question. We had asked why contradiction must be repudiated at all, or, in other words, what was wrong with inconsistency. We have been told by the logicians, first, that inconsistency permits us to assert both sides of a contradiction and, secondly, that the assertion of one inconsistency removes any barrier to the assertion of further inconsistencies. But both of these statements, while they may well cast further light on the *nature* of inconsistency, yet fail to tell us what is wrong with inconsistency in the first place.

We will not, I submit, find our answer anywhere within the field of logic, either in textbooks of logic or in philosophical studies of, and about, logic. The principle of noncontradiction, for logic, is simply an a priori dictum or dogma. Logic can use it, can justify it by its consequences for logic, can point to the disastrous consequences for itself in the event of the denial of the principle; but it cannot, for all that, defend the principle in terms of any higher or more ultimate axiom, postulate, theorem, or assertion of any other sort within logic. The tentative conclusion, then, of this much of the argument is that no system of logic can give us a proper answer, within its own systematic limits, to our question as to why the principle of noncontradiction should be a part of that system.

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[5] *Principia Mathematica,* Theorem *2.21. This is one of the so-called "paradoxes of material implication." The other is *2.02 $\vdash : p. \supset .q \supset p$.

[6] Lewis and Langord, *Symbolic Logic,* p. 174.

[7] *Ibid.*

Now, since we are aware that different systems of logic may be built up on the basis of different postulate sets, there would be no self-evident reason why the principle of noncontradiction should claim for itself any exceptional status. On the face of the matter, it would appear that this principle should be as much subject to variation, substitution, or denial as any of the other axioms upon which the various formal systems rest; but as observed at the beginning of the argument, this is not the case, and no formal system of logic has made any serious effort to get along without this one special principle. Therefore, it must occur to us, if we are interested in anything besides logic, to search outside the field of formal logic itself for the genetic justification and further support which we intuitively believe this principle *must* have. If the principle within logic is simply a partial hypothesis or conditional antecedent whose consequences are articulated and expressed by further formal statements within the system, then it will not be unreasonable to press the search for an unconditioned basis for the logical principle—a categorical assertion of the antecedent of this hypothesis, whose diverse consequents are, in fact, the derived formal statements of the system of logic itself.

Such an unconditioned or categorical answer is to be found, I believe, in the science of metaphysics, which stands, in general, in relation to logic as the unconditioned or categorical to the conditioned or hypothetical. Metaphysics is the science or knowledge of being, unconditioned, unqualified, unspecified by particular or confined determinations, the science of being itself. Logic, on the other hand, is not simply knowledge of unqualified being, but is knowledge of, or knowledge about, knowledge; paralleling the preceding formulation, it is the science of *being as known*. Now, when we inquire into the nature of *being as known*, we should expect to find that among the tests of its adequacy there should loom large its conformity to, or formal identity with, *being* itself. Knowledge of being, if it is true knowledge, will literally re-present the structure of the being of which it is knowledge. Herein, then, we may well expect to find the basis for this logical principle we are presently examining—and indeed for all logical principles whatever. Being is self-consistent. It is what it is and is not what it is not. Therefore, if knowledge is to be adequate to being, it too must be self-consistent. There is, then, prior to any and all principles of logic a principle of metaphysics declaring for this self-consistency. What is, is not what it is not; it is not other than itself; and consequently no joint predication of opposed categories or conjoined assertion of incompatible propositions about it can ever

be true. The law of logical consistency thus simply recognizes and reformulates in its own context the fact of metaphysical consistency in the name of the higher and more general principle that knowledge, to be true and adequate, must conform identically with its object, whatever the nature of that object might in itself be.

Should this last phrase yet leave any doubt as to my position in this matter, let me hasten to admit my conviction that if being *were* inconsistent with itself, then our knowledge, guided—in fact dominated—by its own first principle of conformity with its object, would also have to be self-inconsistent in order to be true. There is of course good reason to believe that human beings, at least as presently constituted, would not be capable of achieving such knowledge; but this incapacity should not be allowed to blind us to the inference that this sort of knowledge would indeed be required upon such a hypothesis.

My conclusion, then, is that the principle of noncontradiction is a law of logic precisely because it is antecedently a true proposition of metaphysics. To state the same conclusion in terms of the subject matters of these sciences, we may say that true knowledge must be self-consistent because being, which is prior to all knowledge and is the object to which all true knowledge must conform, is consistent with *it*self. (Whether being must be, or had to be, self-consistent is a question logic cannot answer, and indeed, has no right to ask.)

Finally, to fulfill the promise of my title, it remains only to declare that the logical status of contradiction is that of a conditionally rejected assertion—an assertion too rich in itself and in its consequences to allow the continued existence of system and consistency within the universe of discourse of its assertion and hence an assertion which is and must be univocally rejected by every known system of logic. But while this rejection is indeed necessary *within* logic, it is nonetheless conditional *for* logic, since, by itself, logic at best knows only *that* it must be consistent; metaphysics alone can tell us *why* it must be so.

GABRIEL MARCEL: THE DISCOVERY OF BEING

Robert Ostermann

I

Marcel de Corte has noted the difficulty of effectively discussing a philosopher like Gabriel Marcel, whose work is still defining itself.[1] This was in 1936, with an incomplete corpus to hand. But in any case the phenomenological method would seem to preclude a final definition, ever; and even at that time the bulk of the dramas had been published, the *Journal métaphysique*, *Etre et avoir*, and the greatly clarifying *Position et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique*. It is not impossible to discern in them the influence at work, the nature of the spirit illuminating the creative and speculative writings. Right from the very start a man puts himself into his creations.

No philosopher, Bergson somewhere observes, ever said any more than one thing, and that inadequately—a comment indeed very near to an authoritative statement of the intellect's nature and its operative mode. The end of a philosophy is in its beginning, even if it be mad and self-destructive; a man cannot think anything except in and through a vision of things he already has; what a man first sees will afterwards be in everything else he sees. And this vision is necessarily one. As Plato saw, we can acquire no *absolutely* new knowledge: being absolutely new, the knowledge could in no way be accounted for. What a man knows and what he says must somehow be his as a primordial possession—of whose presence and importance for him he may be quite unaware, the result of the awakening of his intellect at its first contact with reality. Students and historians of philosophy have in this an invaluable instrument of discovery, except that it requires a deft and imaginative touch; it is not a club. The adequate object of the

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[1]Marcel de Corte, *La philosophie de Gabriel Marcel*, (Paris, Téqui), p. 1.

intellect is being; everything it knows, it knows as being, and outside of being there is nothing. Without entering upon a discussion, which is here unnecessary for the argument, of what kind is this unity of being so disclosed, we have evidently struck off a law governing every labor of the intelligence, every philosophy. This may be confirmed by a slight shift in direction.

The intellect knows itself in act and knows its participation in being, and by this participation it falls under the dominion of the laws of being. The intellect is, so to speak, being, self-known, being from the inside, so that the intellectual act is directed and achieved in unity. Let it be ever so varied in its appearances, ever so seemingly inchoate, we are assured that a philosopher's thought will be susceptible of unification; careless of his own requirements for unity, he cannot affect this. Many philosophers are frequently not concerned to examine their presuppositions; phenomenologists are denied this by their method. Nevertheless, the law is incorporated into every intellectual production; and by our awareness of this inescapable exigence on the part of the mind we can gain entry to the most secret springs of a man's thought, to places where he himself perhaps has not yet penetrated. This is a metaphysical necessity. It follows that the student and critic have one first task, to disengage from its native habitation in the articulated body of a philosopher's work the unifying intuition which is his personal appropriation and expression of the law natural to intellect as such.

Gabriel Marcel's major concern is to resist classification as a schematizer, a peddlar of formulas, rules and theorems;[2] like his predecessor, Kierkegaard, he condemns the fallacy of the system;[3] he dreads the a priori and predicting presumptions of modern philosophy;[4] everything testifies to a powerful and respectable intention that badly needs asserting. Fortunately for our enquiry, the law is verified, or else no exposition would be possible; and fortunately there is in philosophy a kind of prophetic character, though different from the tyrannical sovereignty of a mind choked with static essences against

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[2]Gabriel Marcel, *Du refus à l'invocation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), introd.; *Reflection and Mystery* (trans. by G. S. Fraser), Vol. I of *The Mystery of Being* ["The Gifford Lectures." 2 vols. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951]), chap. 1.

[3]*Etre et avoir* (Paris: Aubier, 1935), pp. 185-88; *The Philosophy of Existence,* trans. by Manya Harari (London: Harvill Press, 1948), pp. 2-3; *Du refus à l'invocation,* p. 21.

[4]*Reflection and Mystery,* pp. 4-5; Etienne Gilson (ed.), *Existentialisme chrétien* (Paris: Plon, 1948), p. 309.

which Marcel so justly inveighs. The mind knows being, which is to know something of everything that is or can be. By virtue of the order in being the mind can predict and prescribe, but only because it has first measured itself by its object and without in any way making an a priori imposition upon a reality not yet encountered. Thus another assurance of the necessary unity in any philosophy: system in knowledge is merely the unity of the multiple, the diverse, which results from the halting manner in which the human intellect acquires perfection. This is not "the system" Marcel attacks. His enemy, and rightly so, is the falsehood of a closed and completed order, a finished world of isolated essences exhaustively understood and tucked neatly away into an immovable point in the whole—a universe excluding the fortuitous, chance, the challenge.[5] It can be said without exaggeration that the first part of the *Journal métaphysique* is dedicated to exorcizing one deadly myth: the imperialism of the universal knower. Here is the enemy, and to accuse him of intransigence in the face of an obviously natural necessity is a fatal misunderstanding of Marcel's mission. He is on to something neglected and important.

And with this we meet perhaps the most considerable obstacle to a sympathetic appreciation of this man's philosophy, the difficulty of language. Aristotle saw this when he said that a man does not always mean what he says; behind terminology lies a view of reality that is one. Language must represent this view, and anyone trained in the Thomist tradition can only be bewildered—if he halts at the words—by the remarkable use made of words he thought exclusively his own. *Participation, objectivity, truth, existence,* and others, need reinserting into the unique vision from which they issue. Then they will be seen as they appeared when minted upon discovery. It is a question of seeing or not seeing; without arriving at the vision, language is meaningless. Just as a creative artist's, a philosopher's achievement cannot be approached except from within. That cannot be done without corresponding with him as he sees, altogether prior to any criticism of the results. Truth has a thousand faces whose contradictions are more often contraries. It is no less true for being an incomplete truth, and the truth in anything is what ought be emphasized. Truth, St. Thomas tells us, is the final end of the whole universe.[6]

Marcel, for example, must not be reproached for an inadequate, careless psychology or an incomplete ethics (Ruggiero seems to imply both accusations),[7] for this leaves undisclosed the reason for his con-

[5] *Journal métaphysique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1927), p. 1.
[6] *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, cap. 1.
[7] *Existentialism*, pp. 40-44.

tinuous reference to the ethical and psychological orders, the reason which would in turn explain his apparent unconcern with both these sciences. He is neither first a psychologist nor an ethician, and like any philosopher worthy of the name he poses the problem of being;[8] he undertakes a research into being, but with a striking difference. He asks, Who am I—I who question being?[9] and we have instantly embarked on an approach and emphasis quite untraditional. Commencing with the being who makes the enquiries about being, ethics and psychology suggest themselves naturally as the richest stores of the ontological evidence he seeks; at the centre of the metaphysical terrain we find the person. The shift is not too incomprehensible. Several centuries of essentialist thought have sucked dry reality. Besides, the specifically idealist tendency has undermined all confidence with any procedure that begins outside, so that Marcel intends to work his way up from life to thought and then from thought return to life.[10] He feels the need "to restore to human experience its ontological weight,"[11] not to establish an ethic or a psychology, but to search out in these fields the primary metaphysical data of the personal reality. The ethical scenes of the analyses of fidelity[12] and suicide,[13] for instance, are incidental accompaniment and furnishings to disclosures of an entirely other order. They are an *accès à l'ontologie*. This adds another reason to justify his use of phenomenology; for after he has located himself in the "personal situation," description and discovery are very efficacious means to reveal the singular realities from which a certain philosophy has so long shut out man.

There is another way to look at this need he mentions. When he describes his personal *indigence intérieure*,[14] he insists upon the coincidence of this experience with an attenuation, a thinning down of being, a depreciation in ontological density to be identified with an abstract view of reality. He does this in order to distinguish between metaphysics and ethics, the metaphysician being in quest of what is, the ethician or moral man in quest of what will be.[15] Man is the being

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[8]Cf. *Etre et avoir*, pp. 34-55.

[9]*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 6; *Etre et avoir*, pp. 161, 180-82, 204; *Reflection and Mystery*, chap. 8.

[10]*Reflection and Mystery*, p. 41.

[11]*Etre et avoir*, p. 149.

[12]*Ibid.*, pp. 56-80.

[13]*Ibid.*, pp. 127-30.

[14]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 279; cf. p. 181: "Dire que l'univers me laisse insatisfait et qu'en ce sens il n'est pas, c'est accorder qu'il y a en moi un appètit de l'être." See also p. 283, entry for Oct. 31, 1922.

[15]*Ibid.*, p. 281.

who suffers this need, and so we should begin with him. He alone can turn back upon his personal data. In later years[16] he will call this the need for transcendence and show how it lies at the origin of philosophic research, though transcendence is not to be understood as a movement away from or beyond experience. Transcendence means, and here Marcel joins hands with every realist inspiration, the passing over into a more fertile productive experience from the kind whose only result is a *ventousage intérieur:* the soul, with a kind of nostalgia for being, feels itself diminished, at a lower level than it ought to be.[17]

Of course, whatever happens to man also happens in being; he does not dispute that. But being can only be reached by and through man who is involved in it, committed to it. If such is the case, then clearly ethics and psychology are treasures; reality touches us to the quick, not just the intellect and will (he never defines them separately or employs the Scholastic distinction) but the whole person. He is at it all the time: "My enquiry into being presupposes an affirmation in regard to which I am, in a sense, passive, *and of which I am the stage rather than the subject.*"[18] And since for him there is no intuition of being,[19] he works out into a lateral development and elaboration which, although it ministers through countless examples and illustrations to a revelation of depth, never takes the plunge. The metaphysical drama occurs at the level of man. We should not complain at this. He is trying to replace man at the centre of metaphysics,[20] to get him back inside reality instead of facing it like a stranger. I cannot talk about being from the outside, he says; it is something I cannot be outside of without absurdity;[21] the investigation can only be prosecuted within reality; the philosopher can never, must never, stand before it as a spectator regarding a scene.[22] Hence the questions are conclusive: What is being? how do I know it? what happens when I know it? what obligations settle on me through it? I am a man, Marcel seems to reason for us; what does it mean when I say I am related as subject to a reality which cannot be considered as objective and yet is nonetheless real?[23]

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[16] *Reflection and Mystery,* pp. 39-51.
[17] *Journal métaphysique,* p. 280.
[18] *The Philosophy of Existence,* p. 8.
[19] *Ibid.,* pp. 13-14.
[20] Cf. *Etre et avoir,* pp. 24-25; also p. 164.
[21] Cf. *Existentialisme chrétien,* pp. 317-18.
[22] *Ibid.,* p. 319.
[23] *Ibid.,* p. 318.

II

The solution, which is more like an evolution or an unfolding, commences with an experience.[24]

Indeed, whatever happens to man, whatever comes from him, is necessarily the result of an experience; he cannot in an absolute sense initiate anything; he is a borrowed being. Or, to employ Gabriel Marcel's own vocabulary, an encounter summons up a response, an appeal evokes an answer. The experience need not be consciously known as such—the regenerative action of baptism, for instance, when the soul is touched by the finger of God, is no less an experience for all its unseen, unsensed nature.

What is this experience of which he speaks in the text above referred to? He joins an honorable group of philosophers when he writes of wonder and the revelatory character of experience,[25] and there can be little doubt that for him it is the experience of his encounter with existence that prompts all his philosophical and dramatic work. The first *Journal métaphysique* has its climax here; from its opening pages to its close we see the probings and reflection converging in this struggle to disengage the experience in its purity, although without success in its pages even when at the very last[26] he focuses directly on it. He examines the consequences of this primal encounter, its implications and significance, but it is never separated out for examination. Gathering up with great skill the scattered lines of the journal's entries, he organizes them in the essay *Existence et objectivité*[27] around the two poles marking the limits of his thought. In the essay their full content and value are not apparent; he arranges the seeds of future development. But from our vantage point surveying the forty years of thought, the mind sees nothing in the later production inconsistent with the foundations laid in 1925 in an essay which he himself regards as central;[28] nor is there anything in the subsequent deepening or extension that cannot be reduced to these first pronouncements as to their principle.

We might express astonishment at the mystery Marcel finds in existence, but only if we are naïvely rationalistic and only if we have

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[24]*Ibid.*, p. 319.

[25]"Charles du Bos," *Etudes*, 5-20 Septembre, 1939, p. 452; *Reflection and Mystery*, p. 10.

[26]*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 304-6.

[27]Published as an appendix to *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 309-29, and, with the later *Positions et approches concrètes*, his most stimulating essay.

[28]*The Philosophy of Existence*, introductory note, p. vii.

lost a sense of the unexpected freshness and novelty of created things—amazement and alarm at a falling leaf or rising smoke, small boats, children, a human tear. A Thomist may not be as *puzzled* over existence as Gabriel Marcel is; but if he ceases to be surprised by it, if he fancies he has exhausted it, then let him beware: he is nearer Hegel than St. Thomas. All the fright and fury of the human mind will not plumb existence, not in this life.

This is a human thing we are trying to describe and so it ought to be apprehended with its full human resonance. Marcel's experience can best be understood in two moments, (1) the encounter with existence and the instantaneous reverberations of wonder and alarm it provokes in a sensitive mind and (2) the seizure by the experience of all the elements informing his intelligence, adding thus to wonder a deeper note of incomprehensibility. Through no fault of his own he does not know what to do with existence; his attempts to cope with it and its exigencies will occupy his career. In those early days there is no way to account for it. Every system of philosophy he knows has juggled existence away, finds it inconvenient to have around. He will not do this, preferring to smash the neatness of systems rather than banish peremptorily the indispensable dynamism of things. We ought not forget that by several centuries of predecessors existence has been reduced to the barest minimum or totally ignored, in favor of rational determinations;[29] and from this beginning he undertakes an acute criticism of the several fallacious approaches to the existential prerogatives of anything that is.

But, first, a preliminary reflection upon a vital theme. For Spinoza, who taught it to Hegel, every determination is also a negation; it is the first and indisputable principle, quite plainly true, for whoever possesses a logical mind accustomed to deal with essences abstracted from their individual state. Hence to add to *animal* the determining note *rationality* is certainly a negation, insofar as all nonrational animals are excluded by the new determination. It follows that for such a disciplined mind the supremely real will be attained by a progressive stripping aside of specific elements, like Ishtar divesting herself of her garments and jewels; mathematics and imagination have united to identify the idea of being with the idea of God; and God becomes an amorphous blob on whom are hooked the various specifications of created beings. Now, it is the temptation of the logician to remain in this essentialist world deceived by its facile intelligibility, to succumb to the allure of its gratifying response to the

[29] *Existence et objectivité*, p. 309.

mind's approach. Obviously there is no room in this world for anything so variable and lively as existence. Spinoza uncovers at last the supreme *essence* that is God. From his position the essentialist cannot comprehend existence, which is a positive accomplishment, a crown and a completion, which terminates the static, timeless immobility of the essence with its animating force; existence which is the unlimited *act* of being that the essence circumscribes, contains, or, if you like, whose negating determination the essence is. Gabriel Marcel opposes this essentialist clique, and it was time that someone did; but out of their world he nevertheless has come.

The more one asserts, he says, the characters or notes of a thing that constitute it and endow it with a certain intelligible content, the more existence is pushed into the background.[30] In a doctrine where intelligibility is conferred solely on a thing by its name (*quidditas*) or by the component parts of that name, existence is little more than an unwelcome intruder. Thought being attracted by *what* a thing is, it clothes objects with a kind of "insularity"; then will be left aside the way a thing is *present to* whoever considers it.[31] "L'existence proprement dite est incaractérisable"; that is, it is not accessible to the action of thought that specifies the characters of a thing. Existence cannot be identified as "any thing."[32] Characterization is of no help to a mind hungry for realism; it cuts me off, as knower, from the reality I address, does not allow me to enter its heart. The living reality of a thing, Marcel declares, does not add up to a sum of its characteristics.[33] Whatever I may be apprehending, if I adopt the attitude to it necessary for a characterizing action, it is certain that I no longer apprehend it as it is. An inevitable distortion takes place, because there is no proportion between what I am attempting to know and the means I bring to bear on it. I am, as it were, trying to fit into a container something uncontainable.

Why is this? The answer, he would have us know, is simple. There is a technique of knowing to which he attributes responsibility for the denudation of the real. Whether he calls it characterization, morcellation, or specification, he means a kind of knowing that makes "objects" of things. Thus the other half of his essay's title, *objectivité*. Objectivity he calls[34] the universality of certain notes capable of being

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 320. He immediately adds that this does not mean existence is undetermined, but this is an idea never integrated into his work and it dies for lack of attention.

[33] *Etre et avoir*, pp. 244-45; *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 175-77.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 273; cf. pp. 253-54.

recognized by any intellect whatsoever. The notion of the object, as such, is necessarily linked with a series of practical operations that can be taught.[35] It does not exist;[36] it is the isolated, insular thing stripped and accessible from all sides, completely comprehended or circumscribed. The reality of the objective order, as he understands it, is by definition outside our own.[37] That is why he can say[38] the object has the characteristic of being something about which I can discourse with another; the response resulting is *valable pour n'importe qui*.[39] Objectivity is the product of the kind of thought he deplores,[40] and it operates as it does because existence is left out. The object, alone, is precisely what the existing thing is not. Existence then occupies in regard to thought a position entirely different from what is implied in the fact of objectivity. If this is true, surely there *is* something very puzzling about the meeting of thought and existence, and we may agree with Marcel that there is more to it than a superficial knowledge has claimed.

It is imperative to note at once that he does not, as did Bergson and other contemporaries, wish to find a substitute for the intellect; he wants a new and living knowledge, a truer mode of intellection. While there is a false way of knowing, which he is certain is an abstract knowledge, he never concludes from this to declare that the intellect is naturally incapable of apprehending the real, or that its role is to distort the real, but only that through some misuse reality has been forever escaping it; by this specious knowledge the mind has altered its object into something other. And how diverse and colorful are his representations of the differences between a universal and a unique knowledge![41]

Operative throughout is the profound awareness of the inadequacy of the tidy view,[42] although his approach to the problem is orthodox enough. Existence is not a predicate: dismiss existence, withdraw it as you would a specifying character, and you dismiss everything. If

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[35]*Reflection and Mystery*, p. 205.
[36]*Etre et avoir*, p. 7.
[37]*Reflection and Mystery*, p. 216.
[38]*Existence et objectivité*, p. 316.
[39]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 279.
[40]*Existence et objectivité*, p. 326, where he writes of the knowledge of "my body". This passage illustrates with admirable neatness how this knowledge happens, what ought be done to correct it, the result of this correction.
[41]*Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 10, 20, 28, 53, 78, 111, 144, 146, 163, 185, 190.
[42]Cf. *Etre et avoir*, pp. 188-94. Autonomy is another sign of the sterile world from which the rough edges have been removed. Beyond autonomy is the existential, the non-partitioned.

we can say, "some thing," it is only because we have arrived at it through existence: "existence et chose existante ne peuvent certainement pas être dissociées."[43] We can, if we wish, be skeptical about existence, attempt to will it away; but skepticism is self-destructive.[44] When Marcel poses what seem to be the alternatives[45] facing the philosopher, the mysterious aura surrounding existence is even more understandable. The first option is disputed because existence is not a predicate; the second, because it reinstitutes the duality between existence and existent that he has expressly denied. Of course existence will be a mystery if these are the sole alternatives, and if he must somehow make something of the *assurance* he has of the indissoluble unity of existence and existent.[46] Existence is there, in each thing, but not as a part of each thing.

Little wonder, since to undertake an analysis of the intelligible structure of reality would be a betrayal of his principle, when a whole descriptive philosophy issues from this. Marcel's vision goes deep: "existence is the limit, or if you prefer, the axis of reference of thought itself."[47] Thought knocks against existence and finds it impassable. What follows? We cannot make a selection between what exists and what does not; a criterion or test[48] for existence is preposterous. Would it not be absurd to claim the fulfillment of certain conditions, like a dossier of qualifications, in order to determine if a thing exists? In fact, Marcel insists, such an idea can be suggested only because existence has been regarded as a thing, a character, that does or does not belong to a particular content.[49] It is likewise impossible to suppose that existence can be demonstrated; nor can it be reached as the result of a reductive analysis; nor is it something derived. Existence "est première ou elle n'est pas,"[50] and no more about it. When we recall the circumstances under which it began, this intuition merits all our admiration. Possibly the Thomist too could refresh himself at this spring.

In order to avoid the "objectivity" vitiating all knowledge, Marcel does not attempt to define existence—an instructive example of method, since it would tend to confirm conclusions about his choice of phe-

[43] *Existence et objectivité*, p. 311.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 310.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 312.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 313.
[47] *Etre et avoir*, p. 50.
[48] *Existence et objectivité*, p. 313; *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 258, 279.
[49] *Existence et objectivité*, p. 313.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 314.

nomenology. To define is, in a strict sense, to explain; and he scouts explanation because of the idolatry his antagonists greet it with. The definition of a thing is its essence, which is just where essentialism arrests its thought. So he will describe and be saved from this peril. And he describes existence as thus: "la mystérieuse puissance d'affirmation de soi grâce à laquelle il se dresse devant un spectateur . . . le pouvoir d'affecter de mille facons l'être même de celui qui le contemple et le subit."[51] This says with perfect brevity all he will build round it. In fact, like most penetrating intuitions, it says more than its author suspects, for a Thomist who regards existence as the act whereby anything is (therefore unconceptualizable) could find his way home through Marcel's description of what he has seen, whose dread of a false systematization deters him from attempting to incorporate the mystery of existence into an epistemological theory. On this count he is absolutely certain; no system can contain existence. Indeed, every system results from objectifying thought[52] which excludes existence.[53] The vicious circle has to be broken in some way; and he wonders, in a journal entry for 1920, if a judgment of existence might not be an interruption of the type of thinking that makes objects of things.[54]

With the predication harassing him—"a predicate is always a response, an element in a dialectic"[55]—we are returned to his *bête noir,* the essentialist thinkers who illegitimately import into reality the conditions and mode of human thinking, attributing to things the state in which they exist only in the mind. He knows them so well, those philosophers, their characteristics and intentions, strengths, pitfalls and failures;[56] he singles out the fallacy of a criticism denying all dogmatism to philosophy[57] and by it announcing its own inflexible dogmatism. We must see him in his own time and place: man is not

[51] *Ibid.,* p. 310.

[52] *Etre et avoir,* pp. 195-96.

[53] Cf. *Journal métaphysique,* pp. 261, 272-73.

[54] *Ibid.,* p. 261; cf. *Etre et avoir,* pp. 203-5.

[55] *Journal métaphysique,* p. 261; cf. p. 156. It is interesting to note how, despite uncertainty at this period, Marcel seems to suggest in an inverted manner his later explicit statements about existence.

[56] See amongst other entries more prolix, less intelligible, *Existence et objectivité,* pp. 310, 316; *Etre et avoir,* p. 269. The latter accusation, though short, is an impressive example of phenomenological silencing of an opponent, which fails to conceal its incompleteness, as does a later discussion of skepticism and faith (p. 309). To silence an opponent is not enough. Few of us are such saints as to suffer refutation gracefully, and the job is unfinished if it doesn't include a positive and convincing doctrine to replace the defeated one.

[57] *Existence et objectivité,* p. 315.

a pure and independent spirit. We must see the pressure of certain necessities which, merely for being historical, are not adulterated in potency; and his efforts at liberation disclose as much about the original *rencontre* as many more explicit statements. One of this kind is his consideration of essence and existence.

As a problem, understandably enough, the distinction between essence and existence is not as central a concern as it was for many of the Scholastics;[58] but certain of Marcel's conclusions further our own investigation. Essence and existence, he says, are quite simply two distinct existential modalities;[59] the question of priority or superiority of one over the other arises because we tend to set over against what is actualized a *conceived* something whose conception was accompanied by an inevitable abstraction from existence. Thought must not allow itself to be duped by this abstraction; it must not presumptuously claim identity between the way it thinks of things and the way things are. When Marcel declares that thought cannot go beyond existence, we are aware of an implication, a question unasked; perhaps thought is not the only act of which the intellect is capable. He put it earlier[60] that this abstractive operation does not exhaust the whole of speculative activity. A correction of this first step is necessary, a *retour à l'être,* whereby the passage to existence is somehow effected. But this transit, as we have already noted, does not occur at the level of objectifying thought—which is what he signifies whenever he speaks of thought, or of something being *impensable.* In a footnote of 1934,[61] he modifies the severity of his statement (journal entries of 1929) that the "I think" is an obstruction in the path of knowledge, although it should not be taken as a repudiation of his position. He is now increasingly aware of the "I think" as a beginning, only one way to exercise the mind out of many, perhaps. Danger lies in halting the knowledge process there where one finds such an attractive accessibility.[62] On his part, the personal technique is to extend the circumference of the initial illumination, which cannot always be done without confessing earlier impetuosities.[63]

Here are his preliminary gropings round the impenetrability of the existent: "Tout existant pensé comme obstacle repérable . . . resistant, imperméable."[64] At the level of the intelligence he dis-

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[58]Cf. A. Marc, S.J., *L'idée de l'être* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1933).
[59]*Etre et avoir,* p. 34.
[60]*Existence et objectivité,* pp. 311, 312.
[61]*Etre et avoir,* p. 36.
[62]Cf. *ibid.,* p. 14, n. 3. I am *outside* the object.
[63]*Ibid.,* pp. 41, 197.
[64]*Ibid.,* p. 11.

tinguishes *thinking* from *thinking of* (*penser* and *penser à*).[65] *Thinking* is our old friend objectifying thought, producing a structure; *thinking of* is an adumbration, perhaps not the first,[66] of the means he will one day prescribe as necessary for the authentication of human knowledge. Thought (*penser*) takes its hold only on essences, with a total depersonalization; whereas *thinking of* restores that community which would seem to have been disrupted, gets round or behind the intermediaries[67] and reaches being, if the phrase may be allowed (it is what Marcel means), in spite of the essence which has captured thought (*penser*). It is the confusion, he goes on to say,[68] between *thinking* and *thinking of* that prohibits a proper understanding of existence and, in the long run, turns an existential world into an abstract one. Existence is treated as a quality—that is, a determination —but thinking of it as a quality will make an essence of existence—or, as he accurately points out, a pseudo-essence—and this is an impossibility. There is no idea of existence.[69]

It should now be evident that the challenge of existence has elicited the response we are examining, a response sharpened and enlivened by the opponents against whom Gabriel Marcel arrays his forces. If essentialism, in order to claim (ought we say usurp?) a total intelligibility, is forced to exclude the incomprehensible element of existence, we should not be too surprised to see an alert, watchful intelligence, discontented with a desiccated mental creation, reach out in other directions. When explanation entails explaining away the thing explained, then Marcel will have none of that kind of explanation.[70]

But perhaps, having gone this far, we can already glimpse emerging a strange world, a universe divided right through from top to bottom, a division so deep that everything Marcel will ever discover and express will be situated on either edge of the gulf. On the one side it is dead, deprived of its animating spirit by a fraudulent knowledge; on the other we meet a living world attained by a knowledge aware of its ontological roots: "la pensée est intérieure à l'existence."[71] How the mystery of existence expands throughout all the various departments of human experience—this is a subsequent affair. Some immediate

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[65] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[66] Cf. *Existence et objectivité*, pp. 324, 326, wherein will be found explicit hints about reflection which later will become a cardinal doctrine in the pursuit of truth in knowledge.

[67] *Etre et avoir*, p. 42.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

speculations there are which form the presuppositions, so to speak, of things to come. Participation, presence, fidelity, metaphysical situation: they gravitate about existence like moons round a major planet. As Marcel says, with a somewhat different connotation, they fill in the context.[72]

III

Following immediately upon the central existential assertion, Marcel discovers certain ideas of great speculative value with a priority, but of nature and not time, over the pursuit of exploring the original intuition. They are more directly the consequences of existence. Existing being is a presence, experiences participation, evokes fidelity, is being-in-situation. But the beginning he calls *présence.*

The idea first appears in the course of investigations into supra-sensory phenomena like telepathy, prophecy, clairvoyance, and so on.[73] The resulting hypotheses attempt to explain certain experimentally demonstrated facts (whose authenticity he does not doubt)—acquaintance with future events, for example, or communication with an absent person across great distances. The solution, he suggests, lies in the idea of a spiritual ambiance with which personality is endowed; and this ambiance renders the absent person present to the seer and communicable with him. Parallel to reflections on existence, he tries to indicate the nature of this ambiance by disputing the accepted alternative of object *or* image. It is necessary to consider a preobjective plane, one anterior to the formation of images, which will be the very foundation of the community whose reality cannot be denied. A short but revealing passage on charm[74] constitutes an advance from these imprecisions. Indefinable, an overflow of some personal magnetism, charm nevertheless merely manifests presence to us; it is but a sign. Presence is that way for another being to be given to me superior to an objectified and abstract apprehension,[75] irreducible to any representation of itself. At this point presence accompanies existence, might even be called co-extensive with it. Should we make an object of something —that is, ignore existence—presence vanishes with it.

What would seem to be an uncertainty in coining here an adequate

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[72]*Ibid.*, p. 41.

[73]Cf. *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 245 ff.; also pp. 162-67, 189-94.

[74]*Ibid.*, pp. 291-93; cf. *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 205-7.

[75]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 292, and on the next page note "l'irréductible différence entre présence et objectivité."

terminology makes it almost impossible to carry the theory any further; and it is in the second of the two unifying essays, *Position et approches concrètes,* that it reaches completion.

The authentic reality of anything is accessible only through existence; existence *is* the reality of a thing which places us in true communion with it. In this way being has a hold on us. This "hold" is presence.[76] Negatively now, presence is not a photograph we have preserved, a copy or an object, a likeness;[77] it is more than the object. Presence overflows, an uncircumscribed superfluity. In a very few pages Marcel multiplies descriptions, calling presence an "influx" to be welcomed or resisted and insisting that it surpasses any subject-object relationship, which would return us to the realm of objectivity. But he pushes them all aside when he writes that a being "is not a being for me unless he is a presence"[78] and when, two pages along, he again uses presence as a substantive. A person does not *have* existence; so neither does he have presence as he would a quality; and just as I can banish existence, in the same way can I banish presence. The inference is obvious: existence and presence are identical; and the movement begun in the journal to unite them is now complete. Using a Scholastic distinction, we may say that a distinction of reason stands between presence and existence. Existence does for the thing itself what presence does for *us* in our encounter with it; without existence there is an object, the reality gone from it, and without presence there is "communication without communion."[79] Presence and existence could not possibly be really separated or separable, except by objectifying—that is, falsifying thought—and this would be a contradiction, impossible by definition. Therefore existence and presence are two aspects of an identical reality.

In order to emphasize this, Marcel says that presence is not necessarily a matter of spatial location,[80] although spacial presence is of course included in its wide sweep. The metaphysical value of the word "with" reveals precisely his meaning, and later[81] it is said that a

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[76]*The Philosophy of Existence,* p. 23.

[77]*Ibid.,* pp. 22, 23.

[78]*Ibid.,* p. 24; cf. *Etre et avoir,* p. 161: "L'objet comme tel n'est pas présent."

[79]*Reflection and Mystery,* p. 205; cf. *Etre et avoir,* p. 211, for the identity of presence and existence.

[80]*The Philosophy of Existence,* p. 23; cf. *Journal métaphysique,* p. 169. If in the journal (p. 267) we read that sensation gives access to presence, it is partly due to the already noted uncertainty, partly to his concern in the context to establish the priority, necessity, and immediacy of the sensible contact with reality.

[81]*Reflection and Mystery,* p. 208.

presence can be invoked or evoked. A dead or absent person can be *with* us, can be present to us—as he dramatizes vividly for artistic reasons in his plays *L'iconoclaste, La chapelle ardente, L'horizon,* and so on—in a way photographs cannot even suggest; in the deepest sense of the word this person exists for us, has a value and importance an object cannot have. Everything turns upon a difference in attitude.

Being is present; but presence must be continued. Marcel conceives fidelity as just that which prolongs presence, renews and fortifies it,[82] affirms trust and confidence; it is the positive statement of hope in the ultimate resources of reality to resist dissolution,[83] a perpetuation at which we actively assist. Jacques Maritain's view of fidelity,[84] in the light of this, would seem to be incomplete. Fidelity is not only the recognition of an ontological permanency; it is also our effective cooperation with being's victory over disintegration; permanency is not static like a law; it is more a history, a story of successive conflicts and triumphs against oblivion.[85] Fidelity is thus creative as well as durable, restorative besides resistant, a virtue of two faces that rises above any categorizing location. That is why he can speak of being in such anthropomorphic terms—"l'être comme lieu de la fidelite";[86] for Marcel's existential being alone could give rise to fidelity. Being is "résistance à la dissolution critique."[87] The kind of fidelity that would be no more than adherence would have to be immobile and changeless; and fidelity, since it supports and nourishes presence, cannot be included within this objective order. Of course there is much more; fidelity has many tonalities. Its creator's imaginative power weaves it into novel patterns; betrayal, suicide, despair, are the renunciations of presence's exigencies by infidelity; witness and hope are fidelity in a moral key; *disponibilité* and its negative signify the expansion or contraction of the self whereby it governs its accessibility to the "hold" which being should succeed in having on us, whether we regard it ethically or metaphysically. All these merely testify to the richness of the notion as he understands it; it has deep ontological roots. This vision also strikes high. The Church is the very type of creative fidelity; our Lord in the Blessed Eucharist is the supreme perfection of presence.[88]

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[82]*The Philosophy of Existence,* pp. 22-23.
[83]*Ibid.,* p. 16; cf. *Etre et avoir,* p. 115.
[84]Jacques Maritain, *A Preface to Metaphysics* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939), pp. 50-51.
[85]*Etre et avoir,* pp. 138, 173-74.
[86]*Ibid.,* p. 55.
[87]*Ibid.,* p. 148; *Journal métaphysique,* p. 195.
[88]*The Philosophy of Existence,* p. 29.

From communion to the idea of participation is a slight step. In the first place, participation is that common living correspondence which all things have in virtue of their being carried beyond the borders of objectivity by their existentiality; in objectivity there is always disruption and discontinuity; in existence is merging together, a connivance of things whereby they are linked communally. Participation is a *rapport dyadique.*[89]

On the other hand, like the creative aspect of fidelity, participation is also a voluntarily executed act (or refusal of this act) performed by a creature whose attributes are those of a person,[90] who rejects or receives the existence of another proportionate to his participation—in truth, to the degree of his initial *disponibilité* to that exuberance of being which is the presence of another. Further reflections on the metaphysical weight of language[91]—here on *receive* and the French word *chez*—illustrate the essentially active sense of the act of participation, which again returns us to the human centre. Thus participation, while sometimes a kind of *perméabilité,*[92] can be understood only by seeing its prior self-initiation of this penetrability. Evidently there is no participation in the kingdom of the object, no real contact, no exchange of an excess between objects.

It will also be evident, after the above exposition, that to think of being-in-situation, our final key idea, is at one bound to transcend the objective, insular world. The operative word is "in." An object is that which is not in anything but which is *before*, in front of, a specimen for an observer. Being-in-situation is being immersed in history, which is to share in the generation of (and so experience) the visible body of history. "L'essence de l'homme est d'être en situation,"[93] and if the human person fulfills more completely the meaning of being-in-situation, the idea is not by any means exhausted there.[94] Nor is a situation merely the sum of a number of circumstances or accidental conditions which might be used to define a location, spatial or otherwise, for situation in its fullest sense may be defined only from within.[95] At the centre of situation there is a dynamism,[96]

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[89]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 155; *Etre et avoir*, pp. 165-66; *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 112-13.

[90]*Ibid.*, pp. 115 ff.

[91]*Du refus à l'invocation*, pp. 120-22; *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 118-19.

[92]*Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 224.

[93]*Ibid.*, p. 113.

[94]Cf. *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 136 ff.; *Du refus à l'invocation*, pp. 111-39; *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 125-48.

[95]*Ibid.*, p. 203.

[96]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 137; *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 138-39.

a kind of "creative development" similar to fidelity's creativity that assists at prolonging presence. When a being exists it is of necessity in a situation;[97] it is involved and hence contributes of itself. "L'idée de réponse est donc la clef."[98] But to be in a situation is also to be exposed. The linking is accomplished. By existence a thing is *perméable*.[99] We have come round the circle.

The difficulties encountered in delineating the content of these ideas are directly related to their nature and role in Gabriel Marcel's philosophy. A strict definition is forbidden us; and so they can only be revealed, or, as he writes in the "Gifford Lectures,"[100] recognized after reconnoitering an unfamiliar terrain. We have tried to construct a map from the signs he leaves scattered and disconnected. However, we shall never understand these ideas, or any allied to them, without making an unceasing explicit reference to the distinction of existence and objectivity on which the philosophy rests. Existentially, being proliferates, superabounds, overflows, is uncontainable. Objectively, being is fixed, dead, contained. The ideas just considered are, in the last analysis, a few of the characteristics of the existential order. In each there is this excess, this fecundity of energy, and each is impossible where objectivity rules. They perform, in their several ways, the important task of exorcising from us the imprisoning categories of inside and outside, immanence and exteriority (Bergson's open and closed worlds); and they introduce us to a new kind of relationship among things. In fact, it is not so much a relationship as an intimacy. *Coesse* is Marcel's own term when language bogs down in imagery.[101] To minds starved by the counterfeit satisfactions of essentialist and idealist thinking, from which all Thomists are regrettably not free, this is healthy nourishment. The exorcism can be pursued with profit by most of us.

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[97]Not exclusively, or primarily in space—*Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 114.
[98]*Journal métaphysique*, p. 138.
[99]*Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 117.
[100]*Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 139-40.
[101]*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 25; cf. *Journal métaphysique*, p. 169.

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM

J. Clayton Murray, S.J.

INTRODUCTION

Considering all that has been written about academic freedom in recent years, the bibliography here presented can hardly help being incomplete. It is my hope that it may at least plot a course through the maze of material available and be of service in comparing the views of Scholastic thinkers with the trend of thought—if it can be called a trend—proposed by those not of the Scholastic tradition.

The bibliography is divided into two principal parts. Part I contains books, selected from among many, through which the reader can become acquainted with the background of modern thought on academic freedom. Part II contains books, articles, addresses, and so on, that discuss specific points and aspects of academic freedom. Further, the items in each part have been grouped according to the authors' Scholastic or non-Scholastic way of thinking.

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NOTES AND DISCUSSION

THE *ESSE* OF ACCIDENTS: A DISCUSSION

PART ONE

Francis E. McMahon

Mr. James S. Albertson, S.J., has written an interesting and (may I say?) provocative article entitled "The *Esse* of Accidents according to St. Thomas." He presents a rather plausible case for the view that St. Thomas denied that there is an *esse* of the accidental order distinct from the *esse* of the substance. His case, however, though plausible, I do not find convincing. It has provoked me into making this brief response.

In order to make my point both brief and clear, I should like to comment upon two texts of St. Thomas that Mr. Albertson did not discuss. I believe that these texts unquestionably indicate that, for the Angelic Doctor, accidental *esse* must be distinguished from the *esse* of substance by a real distinction. My comments, I hope, will make it evident wherein I think the opposition has failed.

I

> Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod advenit post esse completum, accidentaliter advenit, nisi trahatur in communionem illius esse completi. Sicut in resurrectione corpus adveniet animae praeexistenti; non tamen accidentaliter, *quia ad idem esse assumetur*, ut scilicet corpus habeat esse vitale per animam. Non est autem sic de albedine: quia aliud esse albi, et aliud esse hominis cui advenit albedo. Verbum Dei ab aeterno esse completum habuit secundum hypostasim sive personam: ex tempore autem advenit ei natura humana, non quasi assumpta ad unum esse prout est naturae, sicut corpus assumitur ad esse animae; sed ad unum esse prout est hypostasis vel personae. Et ideo humana natura non unitur accidentaliter Filio Dei.[1]

The key phrase in this quotation, for our purposes, is "ad idem

[1] *ST*, III, q. 2, a. 6 and ad 2 (italic mine).

esse assumetur." St. Thomas says: Because the body, after the resurrection, is assumed to the same *esse* of the soul, it is not united accidentally. And because human nature is assumed to the *esse* of the Word, it is also not united accidentally, though in this instance assumption occurs under the relation of hypostasis or person. In other words, communication in the same *esse* forbids accidental union.

Accidental union arises precisely when there are two different *esse*'s. "Whiteness" does not communicate in the same *esse* of "man". If it were one and the same *esse* communicated to the two, their union would no longer be accidental. But it is universally admitted that, according to St. Thomas, substance and accident form an *ens per accidens.*

There are theological implications to this whole point that one need not go into here. But one will find that Billot, in his *De Verbo Incarnato,* has answered a weighty objection of Tiphanius against the doctrine of the one substantial *esse* in Christ by distinguishing between *esse substantiale* and *esse accidentale* in our Lord.[2] These theological consequences would seem to be rather significant.

II

> Dicendum quod, sicut dicit Boetius (Pseudo-Beda, Sent. Philos. ex Arist.) *accidentis esse est inesse.* Unde omne accidens non dicitur ens, quasi ipsum esse habeat; sed quia eo aliquid est; unde et magis dicitur *entis* quam *ens,* ut dicitur in VII Metaph. (lect. 1). Et quia eius est fieri vel corrumpi, cuius est esse: ideo, proprie loquendo, nullum accidens neque fit neque corrumpitur; sed dicitur fieri vel corrumpi, secundum quod subjectum incipit vel desinit esse in actu secundum illud accidens. Et secundum hoc, etiam gratia dicitur creari, ex eo quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, id est, in novo esse constituuntur ex nihilo, id est non ex meritis.[3]

This text deserves particularly careful attention because of the light it throws upon the relation of accidental *esse* to both the substance and the accident.

There is explicit affirmation here that an accident is not precisely a being, but rather belongs to a being—"magis dicitur entis quam ens." And this is so because its *esse* is an *inesse.* Generation or corruption therefore are not properly attributed to the accident; rather the substance begins-to-be or ceases-to-be according to the accident.

So far, the text would seem to bear out the contention of the op-

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[2]This can be found in the seventh edition (Rome, 1927), p. 154.
[3]*ST,* I-II, q. 110, a. 2 (italics mine).

position. Has it not rested its case, so far as textual proof is concerned, upon similar passages from St. Thomas?

But the Angelic Doctor continues. He declares that a new *esse* has been brought about by a creative act.[4] Does he mean that a new substantial *esse* has been produced from nothing? Such a view would contradict his explicit teaching elsewhere that man participates in the life of grace "accidentaliter" (*ST*, III, q. 112, a. 4 ad 3). Does he mean, then, that an accidental *esse* has been created? In a certain sense, yes. But this is not the proper way to express what has happened. An accident is not a being by itself, and its *esse* cannot be separately created. Creation terminates in *esse* indeed, but more properly speaking it terminates in the subsisting thing.

There is only one way to describe what happens: "Homines secundum ipsam creantur, id est, in novo esse constituuntur." Men are constituted in a new *esse* according to grace, which is an accident. It is not the quality in question (grace) which has the *esse*. It is the subsisting thing, man, who has the *esse* according to the quality.

All the texts where St. Thomas *seems* to deny a distinct accidental *esse* now become clear. When he says, as in the above text, that "omne accidens non dicitur ens, quasi ipsum esse habeat, sed quia eo aliquid est," he is not denying the reality of accidental *esse*. He is simply declaring that this *esse* belongs more to the substance according to the accident than it belongs to the accident in itself.

It may be that imperfect explanations of this point, of which Thomists themselves have been guilty, have given rise to misunderstanding on this point. If one, for example, asserts that accidents *have* their own *esse*, one should make clear the sense which is meant. Literally speaking, such modes of expression are incorrect, though they are common enough among Thomists. Hence there arose the problem of the unity of the subsisting thing. This, however, is a pseudo-problem

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[4] ". . . homines . . . in novo esse constituuntur . . ." St. Thomas is even more explicit, if possible, in *De Ver.*, XXVII, a. 1 ad 3, where he draws a parallel between the *esse naturale* and the *esse spirituale*. The principle of the one is the natural form, and the principle of the other is the created form of grace: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod esse naturale per creationem Deus facit in nobis nulla causa agente mediante, sed tamen mediante aliqua causa formali: forma enim naturalis principium est esse naturalis; et similiter esse spirituale gratuitum Deus facit in nobis nullo agente mediante, sed tamen mediante aliqua forma creata, quae est gratia." And in art. 6 of the same question he declares (corpus): ". . . gratia sit in essentia animae, perficiens ipsam, in quantum dat ei quoddam esse spirituale, . . ." Finally, art. 6, ad 1: ". . . quamvis gratia non sit principium esse naturalis; perficit tamen esse naturale, in quantum addit spirituale."

if the relation of substance and accident to the accidental *esse* is properly understood.

No one, so far as I know, has summed up the whole matter with as much truly exquisite precision as has that grand philosopher and theologian, Billot:

> Equidem verum est quod exsistentia accidentis est *inexsistentia*, sicut exsistentia substantiae est *subsistentia;* quo fit ut accidens proprie loquendo non habeat esse, imo subjectum habeat esse secundum ipsum. Sed rursus, hoc non est ita accipiendum quasi accidentalis exsistentia esset ipsa exsistentia qua substantia in se subsistit, nam unicuique essentiae, sive accidentali sive substantiali, respondet distinctus exsistentiae actus. Sensus igitur est, quod actus proportionatur potentiae; unde cum accidens secundum suam essentiam sit magis *entis ens* quam *ens*, ut dici solet in philosophia, ideo etiam eius exsistentia est magis substantiae secundum accidens, quam accidentis secundum se.[5]

That, I contend, corresponds exactly to the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas.

My dissent from the position of Mr. Albertson in no way affects my admiration for his ingenious attempt to solve a particularly knotty historical and philosophical problem.

APPENDIX

The nature of the *esse* of accidents was discussed in the thirteenth century in connection with the problem of the unique *esse* in Christ. The texts reproduced by Reverend E. Hocedez, S.J., in his *Questio de Unico Esse in Christo a Doctoribus Saeculi XIII Disputata* demonstrate that some of the earliest disciples of St. Thomas affirmed unequivocally that accidents had their proper *esse* distinct from the *esse* of the substance.[6] Here is the position of three of these Thomists.

I

> Cum igitur quaeritur utrum in Christo sit duplex esse: si loquamur de esse prout significat naturam rei, cum in Christo sint duae naturae distinctae non confusae, sic in Christo est duplex esse, id est duplex natura; *si vero loquamur de esse*

[5] *De Ecclesiae Sacramentis*, I (7th ed.; Rome, 1932), 517.

[6] *Textus et Documenta*, "Series Theologica," XIV (Rome: Pontificia Univer. Gregoriana, 1933).

secundum quod dicit actum entis, hoc potest esse dupliciter, quia vel de esse accidentali vel de esse substantiali; si primo modo sic nihil prohibet in Christo secundum naturam assumptam esse duplex esse secundum diversitatem accidentium in natura assumpta existentium; si vero loquamur de esse substantiali, sic in Christo oportet ponere unicum esse.[7]

II

Ad tertium dicendum quod bene probat [that is, Godfrey of Fontaine, his opponent] quod accidentia habeant suum proprium existere, quod est secundum quid; quod tamen est distinctum ab existere simpliciter suppositi.[8]

To the objection of Godfrey that there must be two substantial *esse*'s in Christ because there are two *vivere*'s (human and divine), Bernard replies:

Ad primum, dicendum quod vivere, si accipiatur simpliciter pro esse, unum est in Christo, cum debeatur supposito, sicut esse, licet illud vivere habeat respectum ad vitam divinam et humanam. Si autem vivere accipiatur secundum quod est actus vitae et non pro esse simpliciter, sic dicendum est quod duo vivere sunt in Christo, id est; duo vitae actus, sicut et duae scientiae, et duae voluntates, scilicet divina et humana. Sed hoc non tollit unitatem esse simpliciter, licet tollat unitatem esse essentiae, et *ponat etiam pluralitatem esse accidentalium in Christo, quae bene ponimus in eo, quia talia esse sunt esse secundum quid, ut esse album et esse quantum et sic de aliis; quae licet supponant existere simpliciter tamen addunt sua propriae existere secundum quid; et de talibus nullus negat quin plura sint in Christo.*[9]

III

Quod post subdit [i.e., Henry of Ghent, his opponent] de unitate esse subsistentiae in unoquoque, pro me est: sed quod dicit: sub uno esse existentiae totius, esse plura (esse) non est verum in ente per se: sed in ente per accidens est verum. *Et ideo quia accidens in subjecto habet proprium esse praeter esse*

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[7]Bernard of Trilia (in Hocedez, *Questio de Unico Esse*, p. 36 [italics mine]).

[8]Bernard of Auvergne (*ibid.*, p. 108). (He is cited on this point by Capreolus, the "Princeps Thomistarum," in *Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis.*)

[9]*Ibid.*, p. 10 (italics mine).

> *subjecti, ideo non est ens per se Sortes album, sed per accidens.* Nec est vere unum ubi sunt plura esse, quia cum esse sit actus primus, et actus distinguit, ubi sunt plura esse, ibi sunt plura distincta et diversa.[10]

The doctrine of an accidental *esse* really distinct from the substantial *esse* was thus defended very early in the Thomistic tradition.

PART TWO

James Albertson, S.J.

Wisdom is, of course, a personal thing. But its pursuit, which is philosophy, must often be a social, co-operative endeavor. Consequently, I am grateful to Dr. McMahon for this opportunity of trading views on the *esse* of accidents.

The first text which Dr. McMahon advances (*ST*, III, q. 2, a. 6 ad 2) was referred to in note 22 of the article in question (The Modern Schoolman, XXX [May, 1953], 265-78). It was there appended in confirmation of the discussion which I had given to a more lengthy and comprehensive text on the two natures and one person in Christ (*ST*, III, q. 17, a. 2) and does not appear to require any further treatment than that found in the body of the article (pp. 275-77).

It is an incontrovertible fact that St. Thomas speaks of *esse substantiale*, *esse personale*, and *esse accidentale*. The point I made is that a careful examination of a broad and typically complete selection of St. Thomas's discussions of the matter leads to the conclusion that these expressions refer to the single, integral existential act of a being looked at in different lights. The union of body and soul in man is a union in substance or nature and hence leads us to speak of the *esse naturae* or *esse substantiale*. The union of the human and divine natures in Christ is not a union in substance but a personal union; and so we speak of *esse personale* rather than *esse naturae* or *esse substantiale*. An accident, in its turn, is not a component of the nature or person as such and thus does not enter into the constitution of what we refer to as the *esse substantiale* or *esse personale*. The substance or person is complete in itself without the accident. When, therefore, a metaphysical component is added to a substance or person without entering into substantial or personal union with that to which it is added, it is said to be added outside the *esse completum* and to be

[10]Robert of Colletorto (*ibid.*, pp. 98-99 [italics mine]).

the source of an *esse accidentale.* All this is merely saying that an accident does not form a new substance when modifying a substance, nor does it form a new person when affecting a person.

Undoubtedly the chief reason why many feel compelled to attribute a proper though nonsubstantial act of existence to accidents is that they rely too heavily on our mode of predication of accidents. In his own analysis of accidental predication, St. Thomas takes pains to make it clear that inherence rather than existence is said of accidents. We say, "Whiteness is"; but we should not be misled by that to conclude that therefore whiteness must in reality have some *esse* of its own, even an *esse debile* or *esse imperfectissimum.* Were it not for the inherence of the accident in the supposit and its participation in the latter's existence, the accident would be simply nonbeing. We use abstract names to predicate accidents after the manner of substances, but we must not forget that the accident which is signified is nothing apart from its inherence in the subject: "Essent autem significata per hujusmodi nomina [abstracta] non entia, si non inessent in re" (*In VII Metaphys.,* lect. 1 [Cathala no. 1254]). The most convincing treatment (from a slightly different point of view) of this subject which I have found in St. Thomas's works is that contained in *De Veritate,* XXI, a. 4 ad 4; for here he affirms decisively that a *quo est* does not have a proper *esse* (cf. The Modern Schoolman, XXX [1953], 270-71). We use accidents in existential predications, but "in omnibus . . . his, Esse, nihil aliud significat quam accidere" (*In V Metaphys.,* lect. 9 [Cathala no. 887]).

The issue raised by Dr. McMahon in connection with his second text (*ST*, I-II, q. 110, a. 2) is not clear to me, and so I cannot answer it directly. May I observe, however, that it is a hazardous business at best to approach the *esse* of accidents through an examination of the existential character of sanctifying grace. Grace is undoubtedly a quality in the soul, yet its effect is similar to that of a nature since it places man in an entirely new order. In the same way, the theological virtues are indeed virtues, though they operate in a manner similar to faculties—giving *posse* rather than *facilius posse.* In any event, the text cited by Dr. McMahon appears to me to be in harmony with St. Thomas's consistent doctrine as I attempted to draw it from his own works.

With regard to Dr. McMahon's account of the views of early "Thomists" on the *esse* of accidents, I have no comment. It is, of course, one of the tragedies of Christian philosophy that St. Thomas was for long identified with that nearly amorphous thing named

"Thomism." If some of the early "Thomists" plagiarized the words and expression of St. Thomas, it is now manifest that they often missed his thought. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Dr. McMahon's interpretation of the authors adduced is wholly correct, we can judge their fidelity to the teaching of St. Thomas only by comparison of their doctrine with his. I suggest that in this instance of the *esse* of accidents we find them wanting.

May I say again that I am grateful to Dr. McMahon for his discussion. I am afraid, however, that if he were correct, the existential unity of the supposit would be not a "pseudo-problem" (as he terms it) but a manifest impossibility.

CHRONICLE

The Annual Meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America will be held at Harvard University on March 19 and 20, 1954. Papers will be given by W. Wick, E. Vivas, F. S. C. Northrop and L. Lynch. The presidential address by John Wild will be given at the dinner. A panel discussion on the nature of cognition will be led by P. Bertocci, A. Edel, Reverend W. N. Clarke, S. J., and one other speaker yet to be obtained.

The Reverend Herman Leo Van Breda, O.F.M., will be visiting professor of the philosophy of nature and of science at Duquesne University during the spring semester (February to May, 1954). Father Van Breda is professor of philosophy at Louvain's Institut Supérieur and editor of the Husserl archives. He will offer both undergraduate and graduate courses.

BOOK REVIEWS

***Jean Duns Scot. Introduction à ses positions fondamentales.* By Etienne Gilson. "Etudes de philosophie médiévale," Vol. XLII. Paris: Vrin, 1952. Pp. 700.**

In publishing his *Jean Duns Scot* after years of preparation, M. Etienne Gilson does not present a work that is exactly comparable with his systematic expositions of Thomism and the philosophy of St. Bonaventure. These seven hundred pages are intended to be no more than an introduction, and even so they introduce one, not to a system, but merely to certain positions that are conceived to be fundamental in Scotus.[1] These positions are, of course, not unconnected; but as formulated by the Franciscan doctor and in turn set forth by his interpreter—with noteworthy respect for the texts, we may add—they are not found to be systematically fixed in a rigid whole. They take their place rather in a progressive investigation which has its unity from the interdependence of the problems the author faces and of the solutions which he offered for them. In fact, the technical elaboration of his solutions invites a still further development of them. M. Gilson's analysis gives the reader the same sort of orientation as certain comments of Father Balic incidental to the admirable editorial labors which he initiated and still directs.[2] Scotus takes on more and more the aspect of an investigator interrupted in the midst of his work by an early death; the historian has the task of coming to understand his thought in its unfinished state.

Without ceasing to be a historian in this book, M. Gilson has succeeded in producing a philosophical work. He claims from the beginning to be "a disciple of the Angelic Doctor"; he recognizes a unique value in his "metaphysics of being conceived as *esse*" (p. 10). Without inventing a system for Duns Scotus, M. Gilson is successful in comparing his positions with the Thomistic positions whenever the texts suggest such comparison. Unlike so many Thomists who are apparently resigned to—if not resolved upon—not understanding Scotism. M. Gilson puts forth the hypothesis that "a better understanding of Duns Scotus could be of help toward a proper understanding of St. Thomas" (p. 10). This suggestion is echoed by one of the most careful readers of M. Gilson's book, Father Hayen—a Thomist in the spirit of the late Father Maréchal—with reference to a problem famous in the Schools. Indeed, he writes: "One must even have met with the temptation of the univocity of being. For analogy remains a word, or a metaphor, if we do

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[1]The pages cited in this text refer to M. Gilson's book unless otherwise noted.

[2]Charles Balic, O.F.M., "Circa Positiones Fundamentales I. Duns Scoti," *Antonianum*, XXVIII (1953), 261-306.

not conceive of it in relation to the univocity it corrects and transcends."[3]

We shall not here be able to discuss such propositions or, in general, the speculative richness of M. Gilson's work, which concludes with some reflections on the diversity of philosophies and theologies within the unity of the faith. We merely wish to locate his book, in obviously a summary way, within the history—already complex and sometimes confused or tenuous—of the history itself of medieval speculation. To do this, moreover, we need not rehearse the catalogue of Scotus's fundamental positions. It will be enough for us to notice the connection between the themes of the first chapter ("L'objet de la métaphysique") and the last ("Duns Scot et les philosophes").[4]

The problem of the object, or subject, of metaphysics is connected in the first chapter with the problem of the primary object of the human intellect. This presents itself in the very first question of the *Ordinatio;* that is to say, in the first of all the questions on the Prologue of the *Sentences* which together constitute an introduction to theology. What must be shown, first of all, is man's need for such a discipline as theology, or rather for the revelation underlying it, by setting it apart from all other sciences. Theology will be practically necessary for us if it can determine our ultimate end and the way that leads to it. But, as we have elsewhere pointed out,[5] revelation in the view of Scotus the theologian tells us both that God will be the immediate object of our beatitude and that we have the radical faculty for seeing Him. The nature of an intellect that receives this supersensible vision as a supreme grace could not be defined by any reference to the sensible: if being is its natural object, then being is its object *secundum totam indifferentiam entis ad sensibilia et insensibilia.* Scotus, in his first proof for the necessity of theology, denies that this natural object of the human intellect is naturally known to men. Being, however, in its transcendence over the finite and the changeable, constitutes the very subject of first philosophy. How, then, can one avoid the difficulty that M. Gilson pointed out in 1944 in *La philosophie au moyen âge*: "Is there a single question of metaphysics to which the answer can be found by natural reason alone in a doctrine in which natural reason alone cannot even know what is the first object of the intellect?"[6]

This radical doubt has always seemed to us foreign to the subtle and complex thought of Scotus. The discussion of the proper object of the intellect in the Wadding text, especially in the third distinction of Book I of the *Opus Oxoniense,* has seemed to us capable of being ex-

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[3]André Hayen, S.J., "Deux théologiens: Jean Duns Scot et Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain,* LI (1953), 284.

[4]The subjects of the chapters between these two are as follows: chap. 2, existence and the infinite being; chap. 3, the divine nature; chap. 4, the origin of the contingent; chap. 5, the angels; chap. 6, matter; chap. 7, the human soul; chap. 8, intellectual knowledge; and chap. 9, the will.

[5]"Humanisme et théologie chez Jean Duns Scot," *La France franciscaine,* XIX (1936), 209-25.

[6]*La philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris: Payot, 1947), p. 607.

pressed in three stages. First, Aristotle, philosopher pure and simple, does not know that the vision of God is the end of man and that man's intellectual nature permits him to attain directly to the supersensible. Second, *hoc non potest sustinere a theologo.* Despite St. Thomas, a theologian cannot be so much an Aristotelian as to make of the *quidditas rei sensibilis* the natural object of the human intellect. Third, if the identification of this object with being, without any difference at all between sensible and non-sensible, is the thesis of a theologian who has come to know of a supersensible destiny through revelation, this theologian seems capable of refuting the philosopher who would stubbornly limit the intellectual horizon. The theologian points out to the philosopher that, taking the position he does, he makes first philosophy impossible: *alioquin metaphysica nulla esset scientia intellectui nostro.*[7] In announcing the third volume of the Vatican edition of Scotus, Father Balic has given notice of yet more complexity in Scotus's thinking. He himself had not solved the problem of the natural, or non-natural, character of the recognition of being as the natural object of our understanding. Father Balic' has also brilliantly defended, against M. Gilson, his reading of the famous passage of the *Ordinatio* (*Prol.*, p. 1, q. 1, n. 33) on Avicenna's introduction of his Moslem belief into the data of philosophy when he deals with this problem. Duns Scotus is here, as in so many other places, explained through Henry of Ghent, from whom he borrows his citations from Avicenna.[8]

From this undecided debate one may, we believe, draw certain conclusions.

a) Scotus does not put the possibility of metaphysics in doubt. On the contrary he takes it for granted as a fact. The subject of this discipline is equally taken for granted—*ens ut aliquod unum intelligibile in se.* The doctrine of the univocity of being expresses the unity, the consistency of this intelligible. But, as Father Balic again points out,[9] in Scotus the doctrine is in process of elaboration. This makes it easier to understand the subsequent elaborations of Scotists like Francis of Meyronnes, who appear to be unfaithful to their master.

b) Scotus is in no way moved to convict Aristotle of error. According to Father Balic, Scotus does not try to accentuate his opposition to Aristotle on the object of the intellect. When, in Question I on the Prologue, Scotus affirms that the object of the understanding is not more knowable naturally than the divine destiny of man, this does not mean that pure reason necessarily errs in one or the other point; it means rather that if pure reason does not affirm more than it knows (and thence its errors) it will remain in indetermination, incapable of

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[7]"Humanisme et théologie" (cf. n. 5); *La pensée au moyen âge* (Paris: Colin, 1938), pp. 144-45; "Sur l'histoire de la philosophie au XIVe siècle," *Etienne Gilson, philosophe de la Chrétienté,* Rencontres XXX (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1949), pp. 144-49; "Condition d'une métaphysique médiévale: Jean Duns Scot," *Critique,* No. 69 (Feb., 1953), pp. 134-41.

[8]Balic, "Circa Positiones Fundamentales I. Duns Scoti," pp. 271-77. (Cf. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot,* pp. 23-28.)

[9]*Ibid.*, pp. 283-85.

solving these problems. This seems to be the state of man in the face of those problems whose solution requires the intervention of revelation and theology.

c) Let us generalize again. If Scotus, struck by the condemnation of 1277, felt the force and danger of "integral Aristotelianism," he did not, however, attribute the rigorous coherence of a system of pure reason to Aristotle and his followers. In Aristotelian philosophy Scotus saw diversity and uncertainties, as M. Gilson has demonstrated, the philosophers having either fallen short of, or having gone beyond, what they were able to prove. With Father Balic we believe it was a happy choice to put the quotation from the *Reportata* at the beginning of *Jean Duns Scot—multa enim non posuerunt philosophi quae tamen possunt cognosci per naturalem rationem et multa ponunt quae non possunt demonstrari.*

d) Scotus, observing philosophy and the philosophers in the complexities and ambiguities of a historical situation, treats philosophy as an experiment and, it seems to us, as an uncompleted experiment. After judging that Scotus "despaired of pure philosophy because he set it down as an established fact," M. Gilson admits that "at least on the plane of the criticism of doctrines the theologian can still create something new in the philosophical order."[10]

The reality of an order of metaphysical investigation (*inquisitio metaphysica*) thus permits the discussion between theologians and philosophers (*controversia inter philosophos et theologos*) that opens in the first question on the Prologue and continues through the commentaries on the *Sentences.* Such discussion, for example, centers about the existence of God, His unity, His free and omnipotent causality; it centers, furthermore, about the Trinity in the second part of Distinction II of the *Ordinatio,* where the natural liberality of Avicenna's First Being serves in the exposition of the generation of the Word. To understand the dialectic of Scotus one must, no doubt, follow it beyond the proof of the infinite Being as the first cause of beings; one must follow Scotus in his attempt to prove a *prima productio* within the Godhead, that *productio,* namely, which constitutes the Father and the Son face to face. Even though Scotus considered the Trinity the highest of theological truths, he did not cease employing philosophical notions and elaborating them subtly to show that they are not ultimately antagonistic to expressing divine revelation. Whether there is question of the revelation of the Trinity or the liberty of God, the condition of the gratuity of Christian love, the theological preoccupation in the fourteenth century consists in removing the opaque screen raised before the *intellectus fidei* by the philosophical image of the physical as well as the supersensible world. The difficulty is no hidden one. To convert the very instrument of the objections—namely, the technique of the metaphysicians—into a means of explaining coherently the truths of faith, of recognizing to some degree their internal necessity, will be an outstanding achievement. In the use that a theologian, confronted with the works of those who are for him "the philosophers," makes of the technique of metaphysics one finds a metaphysics in act, neces-

[10] *Jean Duns Scot,* p. 332, n. 2. Cf. *La philosophie au moyen âge,* pp. 605-9.

sarily in becoming. The theologian-philosopher appears essentially as an investigator in matters of metaphysical technique when he applies his mind, which has been formed elsewhere, to a new and transcendent subject. This, in our opinion, is the most profound lesson that Duns Scotus teaches us, one to which M. Gilson introduces us admirably.

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Aristoteles' Werk und Geist. **By Josef Zurcher. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1952. Pp. 456.**

In the short period since its publication, this thoroughgoing study by Father Zürcher has provoked no little interest. Its challenging thesis states that the *Corpus Aristotelicum* as we know it today was not written by Aristotle at all, but is rather the work of Theophrastus, the friend and disciple he designated to succeed him and to whom he bequeathed his unfinished works. During the three decades that ensued between the death of Aristotle and that of Theophrastus, the latter gradually broke completely with Platonic idealism and embraced an out-and-out empiricism. Theophrastus meanwhile reworked Aristotle's material, much of which was still in outline form, until the resulting corpus reflected the "Aristotle" that lived in the current teaching of the Peripatos rather than the man who had been the mentor of Alexander the Great. Not more than twenty to thirty per cent of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* is substantially Aristotle, and even here the form and wording with a few unimportant exceptions is that of Theophrastus. Inasmuch as the disciple drifted only gradually from the original position of his master, not all the works have undergone transformation to the same extent. In some of the earlier revisions (*De virtutibus et vitiis, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Physiognomica, De spiritu, Historia plantarum, Causa plantarum, Historia animalium* VIII-IX, parts of the *Ethica ad Eudemum* and the *De caelo*) eighty to ninety per cent of the original Aristotle may yet remain, whereas the later revisions (*Metaphysica, Physica, Analytica, Categoriae, Topica, De generatione animalium, De partibus animalium, Ethica ad Nicomachum*) are principally Theophrastian. Only the exoteric fragments and the Athenian constitutions were untouched.

The historical, philological, and philosophical arguments Zürcher musters in defense of his thesis are indeed impressive. To present them in any detail, however, would prolong this review unduly. Furthermore, the interested reader will find them summarized in Father I. Brady's excellent exposition of Zürcher's conclusions in *New Scholasticism* for July, 1953 (XXVII, 305-34).

However, there are a few observations I should like to make regarding Zürcher's scholarly study. In restricting the real Aristotle in the main to the exoteric fragments and to those works of minor philosophical importance (*De virtutibus et vitiis, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum,* and so on)—for he admits that the stylistic norms for crediting other sections of the *Corpus* to the Stagirite are far from certain—

does not Zürcher minimize Aristotle's possible doctrinal development to extol that of Theophrastus? With the exception of the case of the *Physiognomica,* where some kind of evolution of doctrine is appealed to in defense of its Aristotelian authorship, the philosophy of the Stagirite is regarded for all practical purposes as something fixed and static, whereas any instance that suggests an intellectual development is forthwith credited to Theophrastus. Nevertheless, some of the reputedly Theophrastian developments exist in germ in what Zürcher himself admits as genuine *Aristotelica* (for instance, the doctrine of the *hen epi pollon,* potency and act). Such considerations would seem to weaken the force of Zürcher's first argument from the *Fragmenta Dialogorum.* These works might well be the writings of a mature man and a famous philosopher without necessarily representing his ultimate or final position. We could indeed admit that Theophrastus had a hand in redacting the *Corpus* without necessarily conceding the author's claim that only twenty to thirty per cent of what remains is still Aristotle.

The third argument, too, which seems particularly forceful at first sight, may lose some of its cogency on closer examination. According to Zürcher the "Riddle of the Early Academy" involves the following dilemma. Either the doctrine of Plato is portrayed in the *Corpus* in a basically false and erroneous fashion by Plato's most brilliant student and intimate friend, or it stems from Theophrastus, who knew Plato only through the interpretations of Xenocrates and Polemon, who directed the Academy between 300 and 290 B.C. The primary instances of misrepresentation concern the doctrine of the ideas. According to Zürcher, Plato did not admit a real or physical *methexis* as did Xenocrates, but contented himself with a purely ideal participation. The ideas were the models or *paradeigmata* of which real things are the copies. However, if we read the recent studies of Sir David Ross, G. Huber, C. J. de Vogel, and so on, we can hardly fail to get the impression that Zürcher, for the purpose of argument, has perhaps oversimplified an exceedingly complex problem of Platonic thought. Following Cherniss, he contends that the identification of the ideas with number and their composition of the one and the undetermined dyad is the teaching of Xenocrates, not that of Plato. In the *Philebus,* however, we do find both of these doctrines, at least in germ. True, Zürcher appeals to post-Platonic alterations in this work as well as in the *Timaeus* (confer his article in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch,* LXII, 481-98), but his argument would be more convincing if he did not have to resort to what almost appears to be an *ad hoc* hypothesis. A. Mansion and C. J. de Vogel have at least suggested other plausible solutions to Cherniss's "riddle." Perhaps Zürcher's promised study *Nachplatonisches im Corpus Platonicum* may throw more light on this question.

Regarding the fourth and fifth arguments based on doctrinal similarities between the *Corpus* and Euclid, Aristoxenus, and so on, we might add a third alternative to the two mentioned by Zürcher (either Euclid and the rest borrowed from Aristotle, or the *Corpus* borrowed from Euclid); namely, the possibility of a common source. In this

connection the studies of Sir Thomas Heath (*History of Greek Mathematics* and *Mathematics in Aristotle*) could be consulted with profit. The Pythagorean-inspired concepts of color and odor and the doctrine of the soul as a harmony were known already to Plato. How, then, do they prove definitively a dependence of the *Corpus* on Aristoxenus?

Perhaps all of Zürcher's arguments could be questioned on some count or other. It is one thing to question an argument, however, and quite another to discount it entirely. And there is no doubt that the proofs of Zürcher, particularly in their cumulative effect, lend a great deal of probability to his revolutionary thesis. From the viewpoint of a systematic philosophy, there are a great many reputedly Aristotelian doctrines—such as the nature of the material constituent of things, finality and efficient causality, substance, and so on—that, as presented in the *Corpus*, seem to involve, if not inherently contradictory concepts, at least conflicting notions that could more easily be explained if they did not spring from a single source.

At any rate, Father Zürcher's intriguing study is not a work that can be lightly dismissed. He has presented Aristotelian scholars with a problem that should keep them occupied for some time to come.

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Ontologie. **By Casper Nink, S.J.. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1952. Pp. xii + 496. Cloth 28 DM, paper 24.80 DM.**

Metaphysica Generalis In Usum Scholarum. **By Gerard Esser, S.V.D. Revised edition. Techny, Ill.: Mission Press, S.V.D., 1952. Pp. xvi + 368. $4.00.**

Father Nink, professor of philosophy at the seminary of St. George in Frankfort on the Main, is well known for his articles on current philosophical problems as well as for two significant books, one dealing with what he regards as a "metaphysics of knowledge," *Sein und Erkennen* (Leipzig, 1938), and the other, his more recent *Philosophische Gotteslehre* (Munich, 1948). In the latter work he set up the thesis that the only sound basis for natural theology is ontology and indicated the lines along which such a science could be constructed. In the present work Nink has elaborated his ideas in a more systematic and extensive manner. His *Ontologie*, then, could be considered as a presentation of the epistemological and ontological foundations of natural theology.

Though he accepts the traditional conception of ontology as the science of being as being, Nink points out that his own conception of this fundamental science of the real is not to be confused with that of Christian Wolff. Still less is it to be identified with the more recent existential metaphysics. In fact, if he were asked to classify his work in terms of the recent Neo-Scholastic distinction between essential and existential metaphysics, he would insist that his ontology is an attempt to mediate between these two positions. Not only that, but with the spirit of a true Scholastic, his synthesis represents an endeavor to transcend the confines of any one school of philosophical thought. The

Greeks, St. Augustine, St. Thomas of Aquin, Duns Scotus, Kant, Hegel, the new Kantianism, phenomenology, and existential philosophy, he tells us, have all raised the same basic questions. It is by studying these questions and their various answers that we find the key to the truth. "Each genuine question contributes to a deepening of metaphysics and the theory of knowledge."

True ontology, Nink argues, is both an ontology of the real, or the existential, and an ontology of form, or the essential. It is real in the sense that it goes back to the being, to the factual, to the existing reality. It is formal in the sense that it seeks the inner reasons, the essential structure, without which the real or the existent is not even possible. It has its starting point in the noncritical, unanalyzed, immediate knowledge of being or reality. This "living source," this primary knowledge, which precedes all philosophical analysis, must be explored by metaphysical reflection. In this way the necessary presuppositions of the real are discovered. "For difficult though its gradual philosophical unfolding may be, the being in its inner essence is essentially evident to man by nature." Here we see the influence of Husserl on one of his early students.

The reality studied by the metaphysician, Nink reminds us, is not a static but a dynamic being. Its dynamism, oriented toward a goal, determined by a set of values, and sparked by the force of love, is one of its most interesting aspects. It is here that the Scholastic finds a point of contact with the existentialists. The freedom of the will, the existence of the individual, the radical contingency of the real must be studied. But it is not enough to consider these things in their dynamic state of becoming. We must probe deeper, seeking the root causes in the potency-act relation that is the characteristic of every *ens contingens*.

The method of ontology is thereby determined. It cannot be the inductive procedure of the empirical science nor the axiomatic method of mathematics. Ontology's proper method is both analytical and synthetical. It is analytical in the sense that it consists in an analysis of the dynamic real given in immediate experience. Hence ontology begins with a posteriori knowledge, but it does not rest until it uncovers the a priori conditions for the real; that is, the *constitutiva rei*, the transcendental properties of the internal nature and their relation to the dynamic existing reality. But all these elements are woven into a single coherent and unified structure in the real being. It is the task of ontology to reveal this inner coherence, this natural unity. In this sense, the method of ontology is synthetic. Indeed, if the philosopher merely unfolds the inner richness of reality—the unity, the variety, the order, the truth, the *logos*, *telos* and *energeia*, the static, the dynamic—according to the natural and proper order, he has already constructed a systematic metaphysics. Such a science is both a "logic and a teleologic of the real." It is a science of unity and order. What is more, the philosopher not only reveals the inner construction of reality; he also presents the internal a priori reasons that make knowledge itself possible. Consequently, he has laid the foundations for a science of

truth and certainty. "Indeed," Nink assures his readers, "it is a mistake even to try to construct a theory of knowledge independently of the ontological questions that lay the groundwork." Here, as the author himself admits, we have a point in common with transcendental philosophy. Nevertheless, as we readily see, the "way in which ontology and transcendental philosophy resolve this problem is essentially different."

Father Nink divides his *Ontologie* into three principal parts, the first dealing with *constitutiva rei,* the second with the transcendental properties of the essence or nature (unity, intelligibility, and value), and the third with the categories. This more or less conventional division, however, gives little idea of the depth of analysis or the variety of topics treated under the respective headings. The first part, for instance, comprises some fifteen chapters under the two sectional headings of "Nature and Singularity" and "The Individuum or Individual Being." Adopting the formal distinction as explained by the Scotists as a convenient description of the *Vieleinheit* of the real, Nink proceeds with his ontological analysis of the inner nature, its potency-act structure, its composition of matter and form (not taken in the physical sense of these terms), its indifference, its community, its individuation, and so on. Next, the individual that is composed of these various ontological elements is studied in itself as a unity and in its relation to time, space, activity, and so on.

Similarly, under the heading of the transcendental attribute of what is usually referred to as "the good," we find a penetrating analysis of what Nink calls *wertbestimmte Seinsfinalitat.* This embraces not only a discussion of the meaning of ontological goodness, of finality, of value. Since the inner unity of the diverse elements that make up the dynamic being of the real finds its highest visible expression in man, we find Nink treating the nature of will, of love, of human personality, our knowledge of God, and so on. One of the most interesting sections of this part for the reviewer was that entitled "Philosophia Cordis."

More suitable as a seminary textbook, however, is the revised edition of Father Esser's *Metaphysica Generalis.* Though more modest in scope and less original in systematic approach, this work has much in common with the *Ontologie* of Father Nink. The author is keenly aware that philosophic truth is not the property of one philosopher or one school of thought and that if Neo-Scholasticism is to meet the challenge of contemporary philosophy it must return to the spirit, even more than to the letter, of St. Thomas's philosophy. Not without meaning is the quotation from Aquinas in the author's preface, "Studium sapientiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserit sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum," or the still more pointed reminder of St. Albert that any one man's contribution is small compared to the whole realm of truth.

Like Father Nink, the author believes that the starting point of metaphysics is an immediate knowledge—an intuition, if you will—of the real. Epistemology too, he declares, is so intimately connected with metaphysics that it must be developed side by side with it. For Father

Esser also, metaphysics and natural theology form a natural unit. (One might ask, then, why this unsatisfactory rationalistic division of the two disciplines is not scrapped entirely and metaphysics is not developed systematically as a single science.)

On the other hand, there are significant differences between Nink and Esser. Not the least is the latter's critical attitude toward the "self-evidence" of the principle of final causality and his rejection of the universal validity of sufficient reason. In this connection, we might note that an even more formidable objection to sufficient reason—as formulated by Leibniz, at least—is that it implies the negation of free will in both God and man, a point which Scholastic contemporaries were not slow to realize. (Cf., for instance, Mansuetus a S. Felice, O.S.A., *De discordia systematis rationis sufficientis cum libertate humana, cum libertate, omnipotentia et sapientia divina, cum mysteriis gratiae et praedestinationis, dissertationes septem* [Cremona, 1775].) We might also note that the Aristotelian principle, "Unumquodque, quando est, oportet esse," used by Nink, Garrigou-Lagrange, and others, to defend the principle of sufficient reason seems to imply as a strict logical consequence the denial of contingency. (Cf. Lukasiewicz, "Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des Aussagenkalküls," *Comptes Rendus des Séances de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie,* XXIII [1930], 53; also Boehner, *Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus of Wm. Ockham* [St. Bonaventure, N.Y., Franciscan Institute, 1945], p. 70 ff.)

The abundant footnote references to contemporary literature both within and without the Neo-Scholastic circle call attention to other critical problems of Scholastic philosophy and give Father Esser's work a value even apart from its doctrinal content.

The proof for the analytical character (*judicium analyticum amplificans*) of the principle of causality raises some interesting questions. Is the Scholastic *per se nota* proposition really the same thing as what moderns usually call an analytic proposition, or, in the language of the logical empiricist, a tautology? And just what is "metaphysical certitude"? How does it differ from logical certitude? Or, to put it more precisely, what is the distinction between logical and metaphysical necessity? To answer these questions in terms that even a logical positivist will understand, if not agree with, is to suggest a new approach to metaphysics that would differ not so much with the starting point of ontology as Nink and Esser conceive it, as with its method and manner of construction. Father Nink, for instance, is constantly referring to the "logical" necessity that obtains between the inner elements of reality when perhaps "ontological necessity" would be a better term. At any rate, the connections in many cases are certainly not analytical in the logical sense of the term nor are they deducible from analytical propositions. However, to discuss these points is beyond the scope of the present review. Even to pose the real problems clearly would involve a discussion of the relation of logic and metaphysics and the question of whether a presuppositionless epistemology antecedent

to metaphysics is as impossible as Nink and Esser believe.

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The Vienna Circle. The Origins of Neo-Positivism. **By Victor Kraft. Translated by Arthur Pap. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. xii + 209. $3.75.**

[See the article-review, "The Short and Puzzling Life of Logical Positivism," by Campbell Crockett, above, pp. 85-92.]

The Concept of Univocity Regarding the Predication of God and Creature According to William Ockham. **By Matthew C. Menges, O.F.M. "Franciscan Institute Publications, Philosophy Series," No. 9. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1952. Pp. xi. + 196.**

The aim of this book is to set forth Ockham's notion of univocal predication and in particular to show how, according to him, univocal concepts can be predicated of God and creatures. By way of introduction, the author gives a brief account of Ockham's doctrine of knowledge and of the signification and supposition of terms. Following this, the three types of predication are discussed: univocity, equivocity, and analogy. The author shows that the latter does not constitute a distinct type of predication for Ockham, but is reduced to either univocity or equivocity. In the last two chapters these basic notions are applied to the problem of the univocal predication of terms of God and creatures.

The author purposes to give an objective exposition of Ockham's views so that the reader will see them for themselves and in their inner consistency (p. 8). He criticizes those who misrepresent Ockham through making him "a philosophical scapegoat to be loaded with all the sins of thought" (p. 181). It might be questioned, however, whether his own exposition does not suffer from an excessive reaction to this attitude. In an attempt to show that Ockham's doctrines are not after all so different from those of the other Scholastics—such as Duns Scotus and St. Thomas—he sometimes gives a confused presentation of Ockham's thought.

Let us look at several examples. The author recognizes that according to Ockham there are no common natures in things signified by univocal concepts. Yet he occasionally lapses into a manner of expression which might lead the reader to think otherwise. Thus he says that "similarity is predicated of objects outside the mind on account of a reality (whiteness) existing in these objects" (p. 70). Again: "One concept, 'whiteness', has the same formal character signifying the real whiteness in Socrates and Plato" (*ibid.*) But as he himself sees, in Ockhamism there is no one "reality" in several individuals. Again, he speaks of one concept, such as "wisdom," predicated of God and creatures, having for its object a wisdom which "exists in reality

with its determinations of finiteness and infiniteness" p. 85). The author repeatedly refers to the "intrinsic modes" of natures in existence. For instance, on pages 97-98 we read: ". . . wisdom does not exist *as such* in God or in creature, because it exists with its intrinsic modes." The notion of intrinsic modes is characteristically Scotistic, and it fits in well with Scotus's doctrine of common natures; but it has no place in Ockham's philosophy, which rejects those natures.

For Ockham, a universal concept does not signify a nature or essence which exists diversely in things. Rather, it signifies a number of individuals which are *primo diversa;* that is, fundamentally diverse because they share in nothing common. That is why many concepts predicated absolutely of one reality, such as God, have all the same meaning: they all stand indifferently for that one reality. It means exactly the same to speak of God's "intellect" or "will," for these terms stand for the same reality which is God. So Ockham asserts, against Scotus, that if we institute a new terminology, we can say that "God knows through His will." This assertion is impossible only if the terms "intellect" and "will" are understood connotatively; that is, as signifying not only God, but also obliquely his works *ad extra.* But if we prescind from all connotation of terms, all names predicated of God stand indifferently for Him. Far from rejecting the validity of the statement "God knows through His will," as the author asserts (pp. 157-9), Ockham accepts it with the above qualification. (See Ockham, *Sent.*, I, 2, 1, ed. Lyons, 1495, BB-CC).

It is abundantly clear from the texts cited by the author that there is no room in Ockham's philosophy for analogy as a distinct type of predication. Analogical predication is always reduced either to univocity or equivocity (chap. iv). It is also clear that some abstract names are predicable of God and creatures univocally; otherwise all names said of God would be equivocal and we could not speak of Him intelligently. For Ockham, there is no third possibility, since he rejects analogy. The author suggests, nevertheless, that analogy "may be contained implicitly in his teaching" (p. 135). He finds only a nominal difference between Ockham and the Thomists on the question of analogy (p. 96). In the end he asserts that "Ockham has a place in his system for everything that is postulated in analogy (as a separate mode of predication)" (p. 136). It may be questioned, however, whether this attempt to bring together the doctrine of Ockham and the Thomists does not lead to a distortion of both. It certainly compromises the self-consistency of Ockham's thought. Analogy has meaning in St. Thomas's philosophy and so, too, although in a different sense, in that of Duns Scotus. We can take Ockham's own word for the fact that it has none in his own.

This book contains some valuable elucidations of Ockham's doctrine of predication. It is also well documented with Ockham's Latin texts on this subject, which are not otherwise easily accessible. It is unfortunate that the attempt to bring together Ockhamism and philosophies alien to it has resulted in some distortions of Ockham's own doctrines.

In conclusion, several errors in translation should be pointed out. In three of the author's key texts a phrase or clause has been inadvertently omitted, making it somewhat difficult to follow the sense (pp. 37, 72, 76). The meaning of the technical expression *primo diversa* is not brought out by the translation "at first diverse" (p. 151).

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Religion and Culture. The Christian Idea of Man in Contemporary Society. **By Thomas P. Neill. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1952. Pp. x + 102.**

Considerably expanded and copiously annotated, the second "Gabriel Richard Lecture," delivered at Chicago on December 4, 1951, is here available in book form. It presents a brief but remarkably thoughtful analysis of present-day culture and of the degree to which religion has contributed or has failed to contribute to its formation.

Like Christopher Dawson, Dr. Neill maintains the thesis that religion holds the central place in any healthy culture and that "a society which has lost its religion becomes sooner or later a society that has lost its culture." For this very reason he views with alarm the present state and future prospect of our Western culture which has, for some two hundred years, been suffering from a serious and progressive decline of religious belief.

He takes, as a touchstone of this decline, what is "probably the most influential of all Christian ideas in molding Western culture," the Christian view of man. For long centuries this view was that man is spirit as well as flesh, made to the image and likeness of God and endowed with the quasi-divine elements of intelligence, free will, immortal spiritual life; man is occupied with matter, but drawn toward God and, by reason of his free spirit, transcends the material universe. The advent of secularism in the eighteenth century and the naturalism, scientism, evolutionism, and materialism that followed in its wake have drained man of his spirituality and intelligence and immortality and have left him only his physical shell. The Christian concept of man, which dominated earlier cultures, has disappeared and there has emerged in its place the new man, made to the image and likeness of the ape or the machine rather than God.

These ideas have not all been carried to their logical conclusions; patterns of conduct, legal systems and social institutions still contain much of their Christian origin. Yet, even within our own generation, we can see practice logically and inexorably catching up with theory, for the simple reason, explains Dr. Neill, that our Western civilization today is thoroughly secularistic. The role of Christianity, formerly so dynamic in the formation of our culture, has been all but completely neutralized. Religion is confined to the pulpit and excluded from the market place. The hollow shell of Christian culture that remains is divorced from the Christian religion.

If the central theme of this book, enunciated above, is true, the outlook would appear to be dark. And, admittedly, it is. Nevertheless, an unmitigated pessimism is not justified. We may be in a very real twilight, but it is not complete darkness. Indeed the author terminates his essay on a distinctly optimistic note. He draws attention to the efforts, vigorous if not massive, to impregnate the newer patterns of cultural and social life with Christian principles. In some quarters at least, the conservative role that had been forced upon Christianity is yielding place to the traditionally dynamic one. An enormous amount remains to be done, but, if every Christian works and prays, the twilight may prove to be not the dusk of our Christian culture's era but the dawn of a healthier, brighter day in the life of Christendom.

An essay as brief as this can do little more than state its thesis. One cannot quarrel with it on the ground that statements are not developed or demonstrated. There are bound to be more than a few broad generalizations. Nevertheless, Dr. Neill has made use of his abundant notes to amplify some of his views and to support them by further references. One of the less obvious but very valuable contributions of this little book is the extensive bibliography, furnished in the notes, of recent writings, both Catholic and non-Catholic, on matters cognate to its theme.

The National Catholic Education Association is to be congratulated on providing so worthy a successor to Professor Ross Hoffman's first "Gabriel Richard Lecture." The Association's professed aim of presenting Catholic thought and point of view on profound issues of the times has again been well served.

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Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace. **By Alan Gewirth. Vol. I. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. xvi + 342.**

This is the first of two volumes on the political philosophy of Marsilius of Padua. The second volume, which has not yet appeared, will contain a complete translation of the *Defensor Pacis*, together with introduction and notes.

Mr. Gewirth tells us that the chief justification of the present volume is its contribution to the philosophical task of understanding ourselves and the bases of society. He argues that the doctrine of Marsilius has a profound contribution to make to this task; for Marsilius "is one of the truly revolutionary figures in the history of political philosophy, and the effects . . . of the revolution he propounded are still with us." The present volume is indeed a contribution to the philosophical task of understanding ourselves and the bases of society, but somebody other than Mr. Gewirth has to enter upon the actual task of understanding; for Mr. Gewirth remains utterly impartial on the issues involved. Whether the Marsilian revolution was good or bad, right or wrong, Mr. Gewirth does not in the least attempt to say. It is a little difficult

to see how Mr. Gewirth gets around to saying it was "profound," except by a gratuitous guess after so much research.

It should be of special interest to some "Neo-Thomists" that the Marsilian revolution wrought changes in the understanding of Aristotle that are, in many respects, curiously like those wrought by these same Neo-Thomists. Marsilius's objective, as Mr. Gewirth makes abundantly clear, was to reorientate the whole of Aristotle's philosophy in such fashion as to make its ethics and politics and psychology rest exclusively on material and efficient causes. This gives us the totalitarian Aristotle that many contemporary Thomists agree was the true one. Marsilius's interpretation of Aristotle might be absurd, but at least it is logical. The destruction of formal and final causes entails a collapse of diverse things in identical differences; the common good becomes something willed by the whole people taken "collectively," not "distributively," taken as parts of a unity not of mere order, but of simple composition or continuity. Those Thomists who agree that Aristotle's political philosophy was essentially totalitarian are more mysterious in giving their reasons than Marsilius. Apparently the objective in their case is simply to exalt St. Thomas. In that case their misapplied zeal is exactly of the character of that of which they accuse St. Thomas, except that they have witlessly fallen in with the Marsilian design of ruining the rational foundations of faith.

Is it not interesting that the most telling blow against the Church's claim to interfere in the temporal order is struck not against Boniface, not against St. Thomas, not against the New Testament, but against Aristotle? How did Marsilius so astutely pick his target? Was it merely a tactical consideration that dictated this choice? Or was it not rather the perception that the destruction of final causes and of specific natures in the natural order would alone bring to nought the claims of the Church to lead men toward an end and to a life above the natural?

Although, as I have said, Mr. Gewirth commits himself in no way on any point, he has presented so clear and full a statement of alternative positions that many students of medieval philosophy with less acumen but possibly more courage than Mr. Gewirth will be greatly indebted to him, or should be.

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The Theory of Universals. **By R. I. Aaron. Oxford, 1952. Pp. viii + 247. $4.25.**

The first half of *The Theory of Universals* is an incomplete but an informed and judicious history of the problem of universals. It begins in the middle of things with Porphyry, flashes back to Aristotle, skips through the Schoolmen, dwells at great length on the British empiricists, and ends rather suddenly with Kant as the culmination of the "Rationalist Recoil." The selection of men and problems and the suggestive criticisms of doctrines prepare the way for the positive construction of the second half of the book, which considers general words, common qualities, dispositions, and concepts; the fruit of this itinerary

is a theory which "cannot accept any one of the traditional theories," but which borrows selectively from Aristotelian realism, conceptualism, and nominalism, and owes a great deal to Hume.

The historical survey does not include Plato; but a later chapter, "Ultimate Forms," finds no merit, except possibly for axiology, in the theory of "a real, eternal object known innately." Perhaps it may be countered that innateness is a contingent trait for extreme realism, which might readily be replaced by the notion of "rational insight," upon which Aaron looks with less disfavor. It appears also that the concession in regard to value terms may have far larger implications than Aaron realizes; he passes over the matter without discussion. And the opinion that Forms must either be wholly disjunct, or melt indiscernibly into a vacuous Form of Being, seems to ignore the function of dialectic as distinct from those of sense perception and mystical experience.

Aristotle is regarded as an improvement on Plato because of his empiricism and his insistence that the individual is distinct from the universal in its nature and therefore in its mode of being. According to Aaron, Porphyry failed to grasp these distinctions, as found in the contrast of primary and secondary substances; he "missed the most essential point" in Aristotle's doctrine of universals. Aaron does not himself offer much in this matter, since he does not clarify the second distinction and does not try to show that it follows from the first one. He is concerned instead to emphasize what he takes to be the result of Porphyry's failure—that "up to the end of the twelfth century the philosophers confined their discussion almost entirely to the one theme, whether the universal was a thing," and that "certain aspects of the problem already fully grasped by Aristotle remained hidden from the earlier medieval philosophers and indeed were not fully understood until the end of the Scholastic period proper in the fourteenth century." Undoubtedly this opinion underlies the lamentable brevity of the treatment of medieval theory of universals. But Ockham is regarded as having "very great significance," and his influence is said to reach down to a somewhat kindred conceptualist, John Locke.

In his detailed discussion of Locke's theory of universals, Aaron undertakes a systematic unraveling of nominal essence, but leaves relatively obscure the difficult questions as to the precise architecture and proper stuff or essence of the concept, which is identified with nominal essence. He finds in Locke two major flaws: failure to consider universals of quality and of relation, which might have brought a degree of realism into his system, and an account of generalizing which is "altogether too sophisticated" and out of contact with everyday modes of thinking. Berkeley attempted to correct the second mistake by attacking abstract ideas; but Aaron finds the argument against "singling" psychologically unsound and wavering, and believes that Berkeley was unable to cope with the more important problem of "sorts." Except for his views on language, Berkeley justly receives comparatively little praise. But this is not true of Hume. The arguments for concrete or fully determinate general ideas are viewed

skeptically; but major contributions to the theory of generalization are discerned in the theory of resemblance, which permits grouping where there are no common or identical qualities, and in the theory of disposition, which allows the successful use of general words without the framing of conscious, abstract, and precise ideas. After Hume there appears to be little to learn. Following a brief notice of Spinoza, Descartes, and Leibniz, the historical survey ends with a somewhat fuller account of Kant. Aaron believes that Kant offered very little of a general theory of concepts; that Kant explained neither the nature nor the origin of pure concepts, which were to be the main part of his improvement on the empiricists; and that Kant's major contribution in the theory of concepts was the view of concepts as rules, whether for the ordering or the recognition of experience.

Despite having written half a book on the problem of universals, Aaron begins the systematic analysis of the second part of the book in somewhat unreal fashion by raising the question as to whether the problem of universals is a real problem. Without investigating the notions either of meaning or of reality, he asserts that the problem is not nonsensical, but concedes that it could be unreal if couched in terms of existing entities. To avoid trouble of this sort, Aaron proposes to formulate the problem in terms of general words; his inquiry is into the conditions underlying the successful use of general words. He finds scant explanation of this use in the theory of denotation and connotation, which requires logical purification and tends to regard general words in a kind of dead isolation. The first positive basis for the use of general words lies in discovered common qualities, which are at least apparent identities and are at once concrete and universal. Beyond common qualities are resemblances, many of which cannot be analyzed into identities, but which also form a natural basis for classifying and for the use of general words. What might perhaps be called the subjective reciprocal of these objective communities is an activity of mind which takes either of two forms. In the one case, a general word is a member of a conscious and explicit process which involves abstraction and perhaps synthesis and imagery; this process is appropriate for the perception of common qualities and for the more precise levels of thinking activity. In the other case, the general word is a member of a dispositional process, which involves habits of grouping like things and of using words in a language; this process is important for the assimilation of resemblances and for the conduct of everyday thought. The two forms of generalizing activity appear to exhaust what Aaron understands by the concept, which seems to be dissolved in the operation of conceiving; there are no "internal accusatives" or purely intellectual contents of mind.

The theory of the concept should be the point of focus in Aaron's book, which is designed to be a contribution to "a satisfactory theory of thinking." But pertinent questions remain undiscussed. One might suppose that a process of conceiving is about something, which might perhaps be described as an essence with a special content and with a form appropriate to the universal. According to Aaron, general words

may be used (and presumably in a logical sense) without referring to anything. His negative argument is directed against entities of an intellectual sort within the mind and leaves untouched the notion of logical or ontological objects of conception. Having stripped thought objectively, Aaron also thins out thought in regard to its own nature. Apart from contingent imagery, conception is allowed two ingredients, words and dispositions or habits. To offset nominalism, words are endowed with the resources of language; but it is not clear how the multiplication of words takes one beyond words. In conformity with Hume, Aaron emphasizes habits. This notion entails certain advantages. It fits into the dimly conscious and roughly accurate conceptualization of common experience, where precise ideas and explicit abstraction and concretion may be rare. It may provide an empiricist with an interpretation of categorical functioning that lies between the notions of the a priori and of inductions from finished experience. But the notion of habit raises questions that suggest a more limited role for habit than that contemplated by Aaron. Habits are involved in the use of proper names as well as of general words. The special feature of habits in the use of general words is that they supervene on generalization and therefore do not explain it; if by habit one places a new experience in an older class, it is because one first apprehends, whether intellectually or emotionally, the similarity of the two terms. A habit is itself a universal, which should not be confused with the universal which is the object of attention or with the act of conceiving, which is a particular or individual. Habits issue from past acts and tend toward future acts; it is the anatomy of these acts that needs to be specified. And the explicit tending of a habit toward its future acts appears to stand in contrast with the power noted by Hume, which is a readiness to draw forth resembling particular ideas but not a tendency to do so—a tendency which would abet documentation rather than the perception of generality.

The discussion of habits and concepts concludes the basic part of Aaron's systematic theory and leads to the summary in a final chapter, which might well be read at the beginning of the book also, of his own view and of his criticisms of other theories of the universal. Against the Aristotelian realist he holds that the universal is not limited to discovered common qualities; resemblance and invention have a large share in generalizing. Against the conceptualist he points to common qualities in nature; against the empiricistic conceptualist he asserts dispositions in addition to "imaginative fabricated concepts"; against the rationalistic conceptualist he denies purely intellectual contents of thought. And to the nominalist he replies that classifying may proceed without general words and that it usually is guided by recurrences in nature. His own theory emphasizes these recurrences, which may involve identities or resemblances and which afford a clearly realistic basis for the theory. But universals for Aaron are not merely "natural recurrences"; they are also "principles of grouping or classifying." These principles may reflect natural recurrences or they may have comparative autonomy; in either case, and especially in the second, they appear to indicate Aaron's interest in conceptualism.

The *Theory of Universals* is replete with careful, temperate and scholarly analysis. It is perhaps a bit lacking in an incisive architectonic. Considering its claim that nothing important has been done in the field since Kant, the book does not pretend to originality in doctrine; but it serves an uncommon purpose and effect, since it offers a systematic survey of a problem which otherwise is left to scattered important paragraphs and chapters in the monuments of philosophy. For the student of the psychological aspects of the problem of universals it should be of special use. For the logician and ontologist it has less to offer. There is no cognizance of recent work in the theory of signs. No attempt is made at a general analysis of the formal characters of universals. The discussion of the locus or reality of universals does not go beyond the traditional tetrad, from extreme realism to nominalism, alhough that list does not exhaust a more exacting analysis. At the end of his book Aaron notes the question of the "final explanation of the recurrences in nature." He is aware that this may be the "real problem of universals," but does not consider it germane to his inquiry. No doubt a division of labor is appropriate and even necessary; but if the purpose of thought is to mean systematically and truly, an adequate theory of thinking cannot avoid the problem of the relation of thought to being and therefore of the grounding of the universal in reality.

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Deutsche Gesamtausgabe der Werke von Wladimir Solowjew. Siebenter Band: Erkenntnislehre, Aesthetik, Philosophie der Liebe. **Uebersetzt von Wladimir Szylkarski. Freiburg im Breisgau: Erich Wewel Verlag, 1953.**

Vladimir Soloviev—poet, mystic, and prophet—was one of the foremost leaders among the thinkers and writers of Orthodox Christianity in Russia in the nineteenth century. He was born in 1853 in Moscow as a son of the distinguished historian Sergei Soloviev. As a student Vladimir showed very precocious talent and at twenty-one became a professor of philosophy in Moscow. He traveled to France, England, and Egypt. For a number of years he was an official in the ministry of education at St. Petersburg. During the last nineteen years of his life he devoted himself exclusively to writing. He was an intimate friend of Dostoevski and a potent force in determining the latter's religious ideas. For a time he shared the strong anti-Catholic prejudices of the Slavophile party, and in particular he considered the papacy to be an institution contrary to true Christian freedom. Deeper study of ecclesiastical history and theology, however, later led him to take a decidedly propapal position. He became a friend of the Catholic Bishop Strossmayer (Diakovo, Serbia) and of certain French Jesuits; and during all the latter part of his life he worked in various ways for reunion between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches. He was formally received himself into the Catholic Church in 1896. At the time of his death (1900) he was assisted by an Orthodox priest. Just

what his final attitude toward the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches was is a matter of dispute. In general his case was so like that of Newman that the Jesuit Bishop D'Herbigny, a specialist in Catholic-Orthodox questions, wrote a biography of Soloviev under the title *Un Newman Russe* (Paris, 1911).

He was a prolific writer. Besides philosophy and theology he cultivated poetry and the theory of aesthetics. The second Russian edition of his works fills nine volumes, with four volumes of letters. Perhaps the study for which he is best known outside of Russia is his important *La Russie et l'eglise universelle.* It was published in Paris in 1889; after 1885 he was in bad favor with the Holy Synod and was forbidden to write on religious questions. This is his principal book on reunion. For his philosophical and theological doctrines these are among his most significant works: *Lectures on Godmanhood* (1878), *The Spiritual Foundations of Life* (1884), *The Meaning of Love* (1894), *The Justification of the Good,* and *The Tragedy of Plato's Life.*

Soloviev's philosophy is said to be one of "all-unity." He appears to have been filled with an overwhelming sense of the need of unity. He found some element of truth in nearly every system of doctrine and possessed a sense of sympathy with all groups and a tendency to bring them together. In his own thinking he was influenced from all directions. In particular he had a peculiar liking for certain ideas of a sort that are more apt to meet with a welcome reception in the Oriental mentality; namely, those of the ancient Gnostics, Boehme's notions, and theosophical fancies. He was also especially indebted to the modern German philosophers Hegel and Schelling. Two doctrines are very characteristic of Soloviev's system; namely, those of Sophia and of Godmanhood.

Sophia unites all things. But just precisely what it is as conceived by Soloviev is not a simple question. Sophia is not simply God, or Christ, or any other definite person or thing that one could point to; and yet it is intimately associated, if not somehow identified, with God, Christ, and creatures. It enters into the very constitution of God, and has special relations with each of the Divine Persons. It forms a sort of intermediary between the Creator and created things, and without it creation would be impossible. At times Soloviev likes to write of it as having a certain feminine and passive character. If all reality be thought of as making up an immense great organism, there would be two principles of unity in it; one would be the divine Logos, an active cause producing the unity; and the other, the resultant or produced unity, would be Sophia. It is a universal, pervasive, mysterious entity bringing all things together.

The second great doctrine without which one could not think of Soloviev's philosophy is "Godmanhood." Here again it is not surprising that the notion of unity should come to the fore. Humanity is the point of contact of whole realms of material and spiritual reality. All the different attributes of those great divisions of things are found in man. Humanity is a supreme form in which all things reach a kind of absoluteness, united among themselves and with God.

In the God-man, Christ, union and unity attain their acme. In and with and through Christ the whole of mankind is ideally united with God. This unification, however, is a process which requires time for its completion. Through men the whole of the material universe is elevated to a certain participation in Godmanhood.

With Khomiakov, the great protagonist of *Sobornost* (a conciliar theory of the nature of the Church), and Dostoevski, the novelist, Soloviev is by all means a foremost influence in contemporary Orthodox thought. One could not read much, for example, of Berdyaev, or Bulgakov, without noticing to what a great extent they follow the intellectual leadership of Soloviev.

The edition to which this volume belongs is the first extended publication of Soloviev's works in German. This volume, number seven in the series, contains writings of Soloviev on the theory of knowledge, on aesthetics, and on the philosophy of love. Berdyaev believes *The Significance of Sexual Love* to be the only original word that has been said on love as eros since the dawn of Christianity.

Soloviev teaches that God created the world out of love; and in particular He made man who could respond with a free, personal love. But man fell away from his Creator, and as a consequence human nature became divided between the two sexes. It is the purpose and function of love to restore unity and ultimately to unite man with God.

Beauty also is a certain revelation of the "all-unity." The great final end of the whole historical evolutionary process is the completed incarnation of the eternal Word in the truth, goodness, and beauty that mark the supreme order of things. This objective of all human activity indicates the general sense or meaning of art. We see its function clearly only when we realize that all artistic creation gives one a certain foretaste of the undying and incorruptible beauty of God's kingdom. A true piece of art is "the sensible representation of some object under the aspect of its ultimate condition, or, what is the same, in the light of the next world."

This attractive edition of Soloviev's works in German will be a great boon to scholars who would like to go into modern Oriental Christian thought but do not read Russian.

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Problemi Della Fisica Moderna. **By Filippo Selvaggi, S.J. Brescia: "La Scuola," 1953. Pp. 161. Lire 1000.**

A challenging task of the philosophy instructor is to bring his students to an understanding of the relations obtaining between philosophy and modern physics. The task is difficult because, while the general run of students are apt to be frightened off by the first sight of mathematical symbols and equations, these symbols and equations seem to be the very bone and sinew of relativity and quantum mechanics. The task is urgent. Physical science continues to attract in large numbers the best thinkers of the day; the practical success of this

science tends to create a popular impression most favorable to it; finally —since too often no distinction is made between what is strict science and what is the philosophy of the scientist—just as the success of classical physics was long and widely taken as a confirmation of the mechanist philosophy of the majority of the classical physicists, presently the success of relativity and quantum mechanics is accepted as evidence in favor of neopositivism. We are indebted to Father Selvaggi, professor of philosophy of science at the Gregorian University, for a little book which will be of very great assistance especially to those engaged in teaching philosophy of science and epistemology.

The author first of all pinpoints what appears to be the fundamental concept of physics in its actual and concrete existence; namely, the *operational definition* that only those entities are to be admitted into a physical theory which are capable of definition by means of a series of experiments which can actually, or at least conceptually, be performed. He makes ample use of the scientists' writings to explain the operational definition and to demonstrate its excellence as a principle of methodology. It serves to determine for us the formal object of physics, its competency, its limitations, its implication of a science or sciences which involve a higher insight, its integral function in the organism of human knowledge.

Professor Gilson, in the concluding chapter of his *The Unity of Philosophical Experience,* writes: "If our previous analyses are correct, they all point to the same conclusion that metaphysical adventures are doomed to fail when their authors substitute the fundamental concepts of any particular science for those of metaphysics." The most recent and most popular of such adventures Father Selvaggi analyzes and criticizes in his chapter "Modern Science and Neopositivism." He shows what happens when the operational definition is made the measure of being, when what can *be* is equated with what can be operationally defined. The only support neopositivism can claim from modern physics is the specious support which rests on this confusion.

The sections devoted to relativity and quantum mechanics are, for the most part, nonmathematical and not intended to take the place of scientific treatises. What the author does attempt—and, in my opinion, rather successfully—is to determine just that these theories say and imply for the philosopher. He makes skillful use of the operational definition as a discriminator to separate the strictly scientific from the excess baggage. His examination makes it clear that traditional realistic philosophy has nothing to fear from these theories once they have been stripped of illegitimate extrapolations and philosophical accretions. Inasmuch as their equations are the most adequate and most accurate expressions so far attainable of real relations verified by the most refined experiments, these theories are far from favoring idealism, subjectivism, or relativism in philosophy. On the other hand, a philosopher who professes to be a realist can scarcely afford to neglect the experimental data, with their logical implications, which prompted the scientists to evolve these theories; for instance, it seems to be fairly well established experimentally that the measured velocity of light

will be equal for two observers even if they be in motion with respect to each other.

There are, besides, good discussions of natural laws and of the notion of substance in the light of quantum physics. The final chapter treats of the relations of science and the faith.

The reader, whether he agrees with all Father Selvaggi's conclusions or not, will surely profit from the clear presentation and thorough discussion of so many problems that are fundamental in a field of vital interest. The book is well worth translating into English. Its value would be greatly increased by the addition of pertinent reading lists to each chapter.

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Feeling and Form. **By Susanne K. Langer. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1953. Pp. xvi + 431. $7.00.**

This latest work by Mrs. Langer is, without doubt, her most important and original contribution to contemporary philosophic thought. *Feeling and Form* in not a historical or comparative study, but an independent, systematic development of a unified philosophy of art. Certainly the author has philosophic debts, especially to Ernst Cassirer, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and A. N. Whitehead; but the real merit of this work is the author's ability to approach the difficult and elusive problems of art and beauty quite independently of any previous aesthetic theory, at the same time enriching her work by careful examination and evaluation of a vast number of other writers.

In the introduction to the present work (p. vii), the author states that the present critique of art rests upon the semantic theory developed in a previous work, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Harvard University Press, 1952). As such it represents something of a sequel and presupposes an acquaintance with the earlier book. This reviewer must heartily concur with the author and urge that the two books be read together. This is particularly true for those less well acquainted with the general area of semantics, for many of the fundamental concepts employed in *Feeling and Form* can only be understood adequately in relation to the prior analysis.

In *Philosophy in a New Key,* Mrs. Langer takes as her point of departure the uniquely human phenomenon of symbolization. She makes a detailed analysis of the fact and nature of symbolic transformation of experience, involving a study of signs (called "signals" in *Feeling and Form*) and symbols. Sign and symbol are distinguished by the minimum number of essential terms involved in the function of each. In a sign function there are three essential terms: subject, sign, and object. The use of signs is common to men and the higher animals. The simplest kind of symbol function involves at least four terms: subject, symbol, the connotation (or concept—that which is contained in the intellectual consciousness upon the presentation of the symbol), and object. When symbols are used there is not necessarily the immediate reference to an object, and this allows for discourse about absent ob-

jects and abstract ideas. Such symbol-using is characteristic only of human beings.

After the general analysis of symbolization, Mrs. Langer attacks the most crucial thesis in this and the subsequent work: the fact and nature of nondiscursive symbols. It is her basic tenet that within the area of symbol as opposed to sign there are two quite different kinds. The first has general significance and meaning in the conventional sense of that word. These symbols are used in abstract discourse of any kind whatsoever and come under the heading of language in the strict sense. The other kind is nondiscursive and is called a presentational symbol. Such a symbol does not and cannot have an abstract and general meaning. There can be no dictionary of such symbols since they are concrete and have a singular reference. Nevertheless, they are really symbols since they are constructed (or created) and have significance. What they meaningfully present or signify is the life of feeling—that complex world of subjective experience—the realm of feeling in the broadest sense of that word. It would perhaps be truer to the author's intent to understand *feeling* in terms of the general affective life of the individual —not just the sense and intellectual appetites, but the whole, elaborate intermingling of the appetitive and cognitive powers as they actually function in the concrete life of a human being. In other words, a presentational symbol signifies felt-life or the actual flow of living and lived-life. Artistic creation, the author contends, is the construction out of various materials of just such a symbol.

The remainder of this work is a careful study of the contrasting characteristics of both types of symbol. After laying the foundation and exploring the possibilities of applying this theory to a critique of the arts by an examination of music, Mrs. Langer saves for this important last work, *Feeling and Form,* the task of giving a detailed analysis to the whole area of the arts and a careful examination of how each medium builds its symbols.

Part I of *Feeling and Form* constitutes a summary of the author's philosophic position, a consideration of various philosophies of art, and a restatement of the basic thesis that art is symbolic—that it is expressive of, and has import concerning, human feeling. In her criticisms of other positions, Mrs. Langer skillfully demolishes the extreme theories of expressionism and impressionism. She rejects equally the position that the purpose of art is to allow the artist an opportunity to give vent to his actual emotions with no further concern, and that art is designed to elicit actual emotions in the viewer or listener. Rather, she contends that the work of art is something objective which has as its purpose, in creation, the expression of understood feelings by means of their highly complex articulation in the work of art, and, in being viewed, the communication of this understanding to the sensitive public—or, better perhaps, to give an insight into this feeling by means of its articulated expression in the actual work of art. Each work of art presents one whole significant form "as an articulate expression of feeling, reflecting the verbally ineffable and therefore unknown forms of sentience" (p. 39). Art is

then defined by the author as "the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling" (p. 40).

Part II of this work is entitled "The Making of the Symbol." In it the author develops a general consideration of artistic symbolization and undertakes the detailed task of applying these broad principles to each of the major art forms. A distinction is drawn between the actual and the virtual orders. All symbols belong to the virtual order. A word is actually so much ink on a page or so much vibrating air; in its virtual existence, however, it can have tremendous significance and meaning. Just so with art. A painting in actuality is only so much canvas and various colored pigments. These are the materials with which the artist works. The artist's creative task involves the utilization of the actual materials of his particular medium and, by means of their integration, the construction of a significant form which will be a semblance or illusion of the actual world. A painting is not really three dimensional but by means of the artistic arrangement the illusion of space is created. This the author terms virtual space. Each of the major art forms, the author contends, has its own primary illusion; for example, it must possess virtual space if it is a painting, virtual time if music, virtual place if architecture, and so on. Works of art may have several and highly complex secondary illusions, but the primary illusion identifies the art object as belonging to a major mode. The author summarizes this position thus:

> Expression in the logical sense—presentation of an idea through an articulate symbol—is the ruling power and purpose of art. And the symbol . . . is something created. The illusion, which constitutes the work of art, is not a mere arrangement of given materials in an aesthetically pleasing pattern; it is what results from the arrangement, and is literally something the artist makes, not something he finds. It comes with his work and passes away at its destruction (p. 67).

A valuable theory of criticism emerges from this analysis of the nature of artistic creation. The work of art may be successful, unsuccessful, or spurious. Candor is the criterion. A successful work of art demands genuine understanding of human feeling on the part of the artist and the symbolic expression of this insight in such a way that the result "rings true." It permits the intuitive grasp of its import. The artist may, on the other hand, possess the understanding but fail in its expression through lack of technique. Such art is unsuccessful because it is meaningless. Finally, the artist may have a spurious understanding; such art will be false since it does not express feeling truly. It lacks candor. It does not "ring true."

In the chapter "Art and Its Public," Mrs. Langer provocatively delineates the role of art in the development of the sensibility and emotional maturity which belong to any cultured person and argues a tremendously strong case for the place of good art in education and social life. Art is not didactic in the sense that it moralizes; rather, it enriches the public understanding of the fullness and complexity of life.

Mrs. Langer writes with a clear, concise style and articulates her thought with admirable wit and precision. Her wide acquaintance with the writings, not only of philosophical theorists, but of the artists themselves and her intimate familiarity with all the arts form a solid foundation for her thought. Her theory is the result of broad inductive experience and a keen philosophical mind.

Whatever shortcomings are contained in this book do not arise when the author is pursuing her main aesthetic theme, but in side remarks which reveal certain unacceptable philosophic assumptions. Mrs. Langer has disavowed any attempt to fit her theory into a general metaphysical scheme. This is not criticized. What is unfortunate is her uncritical acceptance of certain inadequate views concerning the ultimate nature of man, particularly in view of the fact that the body of her work provides a tremendous wealth of material for genuine insights into the nature of man, if the reader is not blinded by the author's own suppositions concerning it. This need not, however, detract from the full philosophic validity of her analysis of the nature of art.

In spite of the author's obvious familiarity with modern aesthetic writing, one omission must be noted, that of Jacques Maritain's contribution in *Art and Scholasticism.* (Unfortunately *Feeling and Form* was published before the recent appearance of Maritain's larger work, *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry.*) This silence is especially surprising in view of the marked community of thought in the two writers. This does serve the purpose, however, of corroborating the conclusions of two independent thinkers.

It must be concluded, withal, that the author has achieved a remarkable success in realizing the objectives which she outlined for herself. No further work in aesthetics can afford to ignore this careful study.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems. "Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books received by* THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

ADAMS, E. H. *Logic.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; Jan., 1954.

ALBERT, ETHEL M.; DENISE, THEODORE C.; and PETERFREUND, SHELDON P. *Great Traditions in Ethics: An Introduction.* New York: American Book Co., 1953. Pp. xiv + 362. $4.25.

This introduction to ethics consists of a number of selections, from Plato to Dewey, Moore, Ayer, and Stevenson. The authors intend to illustrate some outstanding philosophies and also to cover some of the basic points in general ethical theory. Each selection is preceded by an introduction, and the authors intersperse guiding comments throughout the selections themselves, which help to indicate the drift of the argument, point out its essential stages, or supply for matter omitted.

The authors' introductions and comments are usually helpful and historically accurate. Their selection of passages and of points to be illustrated are open to the objections which can be leveled against any anthology. Thus, for example, there is nothing on the nature of moral choice, reason and law, or liberty and authority.

ANDERSON, SISTER M. EVANGELINE. *The Human Body in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. 35. Paper, 50¢

ARBER, AGNES. *Mind and the Eye: A Study of the Biologist's Standpoint.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Dec., 1953. $3.00.

[ARCHIMEDES.] *The Works of Archimedes.* With *The Method of Archimedes.* Ed. with an introd. by T. L. Heath. New York: Dover Pubns., 1953. Pp. clxxxvi + 326 + 51. $4.95; Paper, $1.95.

This is an unabridged reprint of the Heath edition of the *Works* published in 1897 and has added to it the supplement of 1912. These works are very important for the history of science and scientific method, and the long introduction by the editor is a very valuable

study. The reprint edition is beautifully printed and offered at a remarkably low price. The publishing house is to be highly commended for continuing its valuable service to scholars and students.

[ARISTOTLE.] *Aristotle on the Art of Fiction.* Translation of *The Poetics* by L. J. Potts. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953. $1.25.

[AUGUSTINE, ST.] *Augustine: Earlier Writings.* Ed. by J. H. S. Burleigh. "Lib. of Christian Classics," Vol. VI. Philadelphia: Westminster Press. $5.00.

AUROBINDO, SRI. *The Mind of Light.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; Oct., 1953. $2.75.

BALLOU, RICHARD BOYD. *The Individual and the State. The Modern Challenge to Education.* Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1953. $4.50.

BARTER, E. G. *Relativity and Reality. A Re-interpretation of Anomalies Appearing in the Theories of Relativity.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. xi + 131. $4.75.

As the author carefully points out, this book does not investigate the mathematical structure of relativity theory or its verification. Mr. Barter is interested only in ascertaining the physical meaning of the basic concepts of that theory and in comparing that meaning with ordinary experience. His point of departure is the fact that there are widely varying interpretations of those concepts. The author considers the nature of space and of light, the relation of mathematics to reality, and the nature of a physical hypothesis.

BAYNE, BP. STEPHEN F., JR. *The Optional God.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 154. $2.45.

BERGMANN, G. *Logic Positivism.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; Jan., 1954.

BERKELEY, GEORGE. *Philosophical Writings.* Ed. by T. E. Jessop. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1953. Pp. 303. $2.50.

[BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, ST.] *St. Bernard of Clairvaux As Seen through His Selected Letters.* Tr. with an introd. by Bruno Scott James. Foreword by Thomas Merton. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953. Pp. xii + 276. $3.50.

This book contains a selection of letters from the complete edition made by the same translator. The longer letters are omitted, since the audience for whom this book is intended are presumed to be more interested in the character of St. Bernard and his relations with others than in his thought. The translation is in idiomatic and flowing English, yet essentially accurate.

BIDNEY, DAVID. *Theoretical Anthropology.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. xiii + 506. $8.50.

BOLL, JOHN J. *The American Library Association and Intellectual Freedom.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Library School, 1953. Pp. 17.

BRITTON, KARL. *John Stuart Mill.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1953. Pp. 224. Paper, 50¢

BURROW, TRIGANT. *Science and Man's Behavior.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. $6.00.

CARREL, ALEXIS. *Reflections on Life.* Tr. from the French by Antonia White. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1953. Pp. 205. $3.00.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.* Vol. I, Language. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953. $5.00.

———. *Platonic Renaissance in England and the Cambridge School.* Tr. by James P. Pettegrove. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press; Dec., 1953. $3.50.

CHAMBERLAIN, NEIL W. *Social Responsibility and Strikes.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. $4.00.

CHATTERJEE, MANMATHA NATH. *Out of Confusion.* Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press; Dec., 1953. $2.75.

COLLINS, JAMES. *The Mind of Kierkegaard.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953. $4.50.

[COMENIUS.] *Comenius: Analytical Didactic.* Ed. and tr. by Vladimir Jelinek. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. $5.00.

CONANT, JAMES BRYANT. *Pasteur's and Tyndall's Study of Spontaneous Generation.* "Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science," No. 7. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. $1.25.

COPLESTON, FREDERICK, S.J. *A History of Philosophy.* Vol. III: Medieval Philosophy, Ockham to Suarez. Westminster: Newman Press, 1953. $5.00.

CORNFORTH, MAURICE. *Materialism and the Dialectical Method: Systematic Discussion of Marxist Philosophy.* New York: International Publs., 1953. $1.75.

CROMBIE, ALASTAIR CAMERON. *Augustine to Galileo.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 451. $9.00.

CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM F. *General Education and the Liberal College.* Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1953. Pp. xviii + 286. $4.00.

A truly significant contribution to the philosophy of education is a rarity. Many criticisms of over-specialization have been made in recent years, but well-thought-out, positive plans that are realistic as well as farsighted have been few. The author has been studying, planning, and writing about liberal education for more than thirty years.

Though most of what the author says is well proposed and very well argued, some few points remain debatable. For instance, it is not clear that the lay undergraduate can or should receive a training in theology "the equal of seminary courses in difficulty of content" (p. 104).

CURTI, MERLE EUGENE (ed.). *American Scholarship in the Twentieth Century.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 259. $4.50.

CURTIUS, ERNST ROBERT. *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. Pp. 650. $5.50.

CZERWONKY, HUGO E. *Freedom from Insecurity.* Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1953. $3.75.

D'ARCY, M. C., S.J. *St. Thomas Aquinas.* Westminster: Newman Press; Dec., 1953. $3.75.

DAY, HARVEY. *About Yoga.* 3d ed. New York: British Book Centre, 1953. Pp. 160. $2.00.

DESCARTES, RENE. *Descartes' Philosophical Writings.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. $3.75.

DEUTSCH, KARL W. *Nationalism and Social Communication.* New York: Wiley and Technology Press, 1953. Pp. 302. $5.00.

DEWEY, JOHN. *Essays in Experimental Logic.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1953. $3.50; Paper, $1.75.

DEWITT, NORMAN W. *Epicurus and His Philosophy.* Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press.

DE WULF, MAURICE. *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages.* New York: Dover Pubns., 1953. Pp. x + 312. $3.50; Paper, $1.50.

This book, first published in 1922, contains the lectures which the distinguished historian gave on the Louis Clark Vanuxem foundation. It is a synthetic presentation of the spirit of medieval thought as a whole and in relation to the rest of medieval culture. The author is an acknowledged master of his subject, and the book can be highly

recommended to the general reader. It should, moreover, be familiar to the student of medieval philosophy, since it can provide the broad background against which the more specialized topic of medieval philosophy must be understood.

DREYER, J. L. E. *A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler.* Formerly titled, *History of the Planetary Systems from Thales to Kepler.* Rev. ed. Foreword by W. H. Stahl. New York: Dover Pubns., 1953. Pp. x + 438. $3.95; Paper, $1.95.

This work, originally published in 1905, remains one of the classics of the history of science. Despite some flaws of interpretation owing to inadequate knowledge of medieval and Arabian thought, the author has succeeded in grasping the spirit and the method of the great astronomers to a very great extent. And no later author has attempted a study which matches the present one in scope and power of presentation.

The present edition has a short foreword by the editor, who has also added a supplementary bibliography by means of which the reader can complete his knowledge with the results of later studies. Some corrections, mostly typographical, have been made.

DRINKER, HENRY S. *Legal Ethics.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 470. $4.00.

DUHEM, PIERRE. *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.* Tr. by Philip P. Wiener. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Dec., 1953. $6.00.

FANG, PAO-HSIEN. *On the Theories of the Rest-Mass Spectrum of the Elementary Particles.* A Dissertation. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. 32. Paper, 50¢

FECHER, CHARLES A. *The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain.* Westminster: Newman Press, 1953. $5.00.

FEIGL, HERBERT, and BRODBECK, MAY. *Readings in the Philosophy of Science.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.

FIELD, G. C. *Plato and His Contemporaries.* New York: British Book Centre, 1953. $3.50.

FLOOD, DOM PETER (ed.). *New Problems in Medical Ethics.* Tr. by Malachy Carroll and Norman Reeves. Westminster: Newman Press, 1953. Pp. 263. $4.50.

FOTHERGILL, PHILIP G. *Historical Aspects of Organic Evolution.* Foreword by J. W. Heslop-Harrison. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. xvii + 427. $6.00.

Historical studies of scientific concepts are of great value to scientists themselves and also to philosophers who are trying to work out a philosophy of science. The present book deals with what is the most basic biological concept. It traces the idea from the backgrounds of ancient Greek speculation to the present time. Dealing in such summary fashion with so many thinkers sometimes leads to inaccuracies; in the present book they seem to be relatively few.

The bibliography is extensive (pp. 379-408); as is to be expected, many of the references are to British publications. There is a detailed index.

FRANK, JEROME. *Fate and Freedom.* Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon Press; Oct., 1953. $4.00.

FUNG YU-LAN. *A History of Chinese Philosophy.* Vol. II. Tr. from the Chinese by Derk Bodde. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 808. $7.50.

GALILEI, GALILEO. *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems.* Tr. by Stillman Drake. Foreword by Albert Einstein. Berkeley: Univ.

of California Press; Oct., 1953. Pp. 520. $10.00.

———. *Dialogue on the Great World Systems.* Tr. by T. Salusbury. Revised, annotated, and with an introduction by Giorgio de Santillana. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. $12.50.

GERHART, EUGENE G. *American Liberty and "Natural Law."* Foreword by Roscoe Pound. Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1953. $3.00.

GILSON, ETIENNE. *Choir of Muses.* Tr. from the French by Maisie Ward. New York: Sheed & Ward. Pp. 196. $3.50.

———. *Thomas Aquinas and Our Colleagues.* Princeton: The Aquinas Foundation, 1953. Pp. v + 26. Paper, $1.00.

GINSBERG, MORRIS. *The Idea of Progress. A Revaluation.* Boston: Beacon Press; Oct., 1953. $1.75.

God, Man and the Universe. Ed. by Jacques de Bivort de La Saudée. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons; Oct., 1953. Pp. 500. $6.50.

GOMPERZ, HEINRICH. *Philosophical Studies.* Ed. by Daniel S. Robinson. Foreword by Philip Merlan. Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1953. Pp. 287. $7.50.

Heinrich Gomperz is perhaps best known to English readers as a historian of Greek philosophy. He has, however, done even more writing in the fields of ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. The present volume contains essays and papers relating to Greek philosophy, to ethics, and to epistemology. Some of these studies have appeared before; most have never been published. Scholars will be grateful to have these studies available in a convenient form.

There are a bibliography and an index.

GRABOWSKI, STANISLAUS J. *All-present God: A Study in St. Augustine.* Saint Louis: B. Herber Book Co., 1953. $4.75.

GRAUBARD, MARK. *Astrology and Alchemy. Two Fossil Sciences.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. xi + 382. $5.00.

Many historians of science try to show the difference between scientific and other knowledge by referring to thought prior to modern science as mingled with superstition, magic, and so on. But the movement which is modern science has an ancient and honorable past. The present book tries to show that ancient astrology and alchemy were in their way attempts at scientific explanations. In a field which has been rather neglected by serious historians (except for Thorndike's monumental study), the author has produced a work that is able to be understood by an ordinary reader and one that is highly interesting and informative.

GREGORY OF NYSSA, ST. *Sermons on the Lord's Prayer and the Beatitudes.* Tr. by Hilda Graef. "Ancient Christian Writers" Vol. 18. Westminster: Newman Press; Jan., 1954. $3.50.

GUTHRIE, W. K. C. *Greek Philosophy.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 28. 60¢

[HEGEL, GEORGE WILHELM FRIEDRICH.] *Philosophy of Hegel.* Ed. by Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Modern Lib. $1.25.

HEINEMANN, FRED H. *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Pp. 218. $3.50.

HERSKOVITS, MELVILLE J. *Franz Boas. The Science of Man in the Making.* "Twentieth Century Library." New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1953. Pp. 131. $2.50.

Boas was perhaps the most influential figure in determining the direction which anthropology has taken. The author considers that Boas's major contributions were his rejection of the popular concept of race (and of the consequent racist ideologies) and his establishing

of the method of field work as the tool of the science. His broadly human interests and his far-flung activities made him more than a mere specialist and gave him influence in related fields as well as in his own chosen field. The author does not point out Boas's philosophical and methodological limitations; but for all that, his study is thorough, sympathetic, and rewarding.

HILTNER, SEWARD. *Sex Ethics and the Kinsey Reports.* New York: Association Press, 1953. $3.00.

HOHLENBERG, JOHANNES. *Soren Kierkegaard.* Tr. by T. H. Croxall. New York: Pantheon Books; Jan., 1954. $5.00.

HUTCHINS, ROBERT MAYNARD. *The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Pp. 119. $2.00.

HUTCHINSON, GEORGE EVELYN. *The Itinerant Ivory Tower.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, Pp. 272. $4.00.

JASPERS, KARL. *The Origin and Goal of History.* Tr. from the German by Michael Bullock. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 310. $4.00.

[JUNG, C. G.] *Psychological Reflections: An Anthology of Passages from the Writings of C. G. Jung.* Ed. by Jolande Jacobi. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. $4.50.

———. *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology.* Tr. by R. F. C. Hull. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. $3.75.

KEATING, JAMES. *The Function of the Philosopher in American Pragmatism.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. 43. Paper, 50¢

LANGER, SUSANNE K. *An Introduction to Symbolic Logic.* 2d rev. ed. New York: Dover Pubns., 1953. Pp. 367. $3.50; Paper, $1.60.

This has been a successful and useful textbook since its appearance in 1937. The present edition adds some books to the list of further readings and an appendix on truth-tables, and makes a change of some importance in Chapter IV.

The book is valuable because it attempts to explain to the student the basic meaning of logical operations and relations, rather than simply providing him with rules by which the logic can be applied.

LAWRENCE, EVELYN MARY (ed.). *Friedrich Froebel and English Education.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. 248. $5.00.

LEAN, MARTIN. *Sense-Perception and Matter.* New York: Humanities Press, 1953. $4.50.

LE BUFFE, FRANCIS PETER, S.J., and HAYES, JAMES VINCENT DE PAUL. *The American Philosophy of Law.* New York: Jesuit Educational Assn., 1953. Pp. 529, $6.00.

Let Freedom Ring. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953. Pp. 96. 50¢

LEVINSON, RONALD B. *In Defense of Plato.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. $10.00.

LIPSKY, GEORGE A. *Law and Politics in the World Community.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; Nov., 1953. Pp. 424. $6.00.

LODGE, R. C. *Plato's Theory of Art.* New York: Humanities Press, 1953. $5.00.

LONG, MARCUS. *The Spirit of Philosophy.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1953. Pp. 314. $4.00.

MACE, CECIL ALEC, and VERNON, PHILLIP EWART (eds.). *Current Trends in British Psychology.* New York: British Book Centre, 1953. Pp. 270. $3.25.

MASON, STEPHEN F. *Main Currents of Scientific Thought.* New York:

Henry Schuman, 1953. $5.00.

MAURIAC, FRANÇOIS. *Letters on Art and Literature.* Tr. by Mario A. Pei. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. 120. $3.00.

This volume is a translation of *Lettres Ouvertes.* Its contents are suggested partly by the general title, partly by the subjects of the individual letters: "After the Death of Georges Bernanos"; "What Do You Expect of a Priest?"; "To Albert Camus"; "To a Lady Who Wanted to Send Me 'The Dictionary of Weathervanes' "; "Concerning a Crime against 'Carmen' "; "To a 'Round Table' Subscriber"; "Concerning the Claudel-Gide Correspondence"; "Scouts and Guides"; "More About Scouts and Guides"; "To Jean Cocteau, on the Subject of *Bacchus.*" There is more political and ethical discussion than the titles would indicate.

There is no index, not even a table of contents.

MUIRHEAD, JOHN HENRY (ed.). *Contemporary British Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. Pp. 799. $6.00.

NEGLEY, GLENN, and PATRICK, J. MAX. *The Quest for Utopia. An Anthology of Imaginary Societies.* New York: Henry Schuman, 1953. Pp. 608. $6.75.

NEILL, THOMAS P. *Rise and Decline of Liberalism.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1953. $5.00.

[NEWTON, SIR ISAAC.] *Newton's Philosophy of Nature: Selected Writing.* Ed. by H. S. Thayer. "Hafner Library of Classics," No. 16. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1953. $2.25; Paper, $1.15.

O'CONNOR, JOHN JOSEPH. *Philosophical Aspects of Communication.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. 34. Paper, 50¢

Organized Communism in the United States. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953. Pp. 150. Paper, 35¢

PETRITZ, MARGARET M. *The Philosophy of Anger and the Virtues.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. 30. Paper, 50¢

[PHILO JUDAEUS.] *Philo.* Tr. from the ancient Armenian version of the original Greek by Ralph Marcus. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 571; 314. $3.00 ea.

PIEPER, JOSEF. *Fortitude and Temperance.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. $2.75.

[PLATO.] *Dialogues of Plato.* Tr. by B. Jowett; 4th ed. Ed. by D. J. Allan and H. E. Dale. 4 vols. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953. $21.00.

Plotinus. Ed. by A. H. Armstrong. New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. Pp. 173. $2.50.

PREYRE, E. A. *Freedom of Doubt: Reflections of a Natural Sceptic.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. $2.75.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Vol. XXVII. Twenty-seventh Annual Meeting: Apr. 7 and 8, 1953. Washington: Office of the Secretary, 1953. Pp. 207.

This volume of the *Proceedings* contains the addresses, papers, and discussions of the meeting held on April 7 and 8, 1953. The general theme of the session was philosophy and unity. The presidential address, by Dr. Elizabeth G. Salmon, was entitled "Philosophy and the Unity of Wisdom" and dealt with the place and importance of metaphysics in philosophical thinking. The four major papers dealt with aspects of the problem of unity. Dr. Edward Q. Franz, in "Philosophy and the Unity of Knowledge," showed how Thomism can be a unifying factor for the widely divergent movements called scientism and existentialism. M. Jacques Maritain, in his paper, "Philosophy and the Unity of the Sciences," summarized his well-

known doctrine of the relation between the philosophy of nature and the sciences, adding several new exemplifications and developing the doctrine somewhat. The paper given by Very Reverend L.-M. Régis, O.P., on the unity of the philosophy of nature and its distinction from the sciences, is unfortunately not printed. The paper by Reverend Gerard Smith, S.J., on the unity of man's ultimate end, is a brilliant summary of recent discussion about man's last end and an even more brilliant demonstration of the way in which knowledge of the last end functions in practical knowledge and choice.

QUASTEN, JOHANNES. *Patrology.* Vol. II, The Ante-Nicene Literature after Irenaeus. Westminster: Newman Press, 1953. Pp. 461. $5.50.

QUINE, WILLARD VAN ORMAN. *From a Logical Point of View.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 190. $3.50.

RADHAKRISHNAN, S. (ed. and tr.). *The Upanisads.* New York: Harper & Bros.; Jan., 1954. $10.00.

RAEYMAEKER, LOUIS DE. *Philosophy of Being: A Synthesis of Metaphysics.* Tr. by Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer, S.J. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1953. $4.75.

RAPOPORT, ANATOL. *Operational Philosophy: Integrating Knowledge and Action.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. $3.75.

RATNER, SIDNEY (ed.). *Vision and Action: Essays in Honor of Horace M. Kallen on his 70th Birthday.* New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953. $5.00.

Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months' Ended June 30, 1953. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953. Pp. 61. Paper, 35¢

REUTEMANN, BROTHER CHARLES. *The Thomistic Concept of Pleasure, as Compared with Hedonistic and Rigoristic Philosophies.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. 44. Paper, 50¢

RIESMAN, DAVID. *Thorstein Veblen. A Critical Interpretation.* "Twentieth Century Library." New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1953. Pp. xv + 221. $3.00.

This volume differs from many others in the same series in that its author, as he himself says, is not a follower of his subject; and so the book is called "a critical interpretation." Yet the author is very well acquainted with Veblen's thought and is more influenced by its spirit than by its particular conclusions. Even his style is witty and ironical and at times involuted. The author makes use of *avant-garde* styles in biography, using Veblenian, Freudian, and "sociology-of-thought" interpretations to "explain" Veblen's mode of life and highly critical attitude toward capitalist economy. The book is, as a result, sometimes stimulating, sometimes merely irritating.

ROBINSON, RICHARD. *Plato's Earlier Dialectic.* 2d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953. $5.00.

ROSEN, HAROLD (ed.). *Therapeutic Abortion: Medical, Psychiatric, Legal, Anthropological and Religious Considerations.* New York: Julian Press; Dec., 1953. $6.50.

[SANTAYANA, GEORGE.] *The Philosophy of Santayana. Selections from All the Works of George Santayana.* New and greatly enlarged edition. Ed., with a new preface and an introductory essay, by Irwin Edman. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1953. Pp. lxii + 904. $6.50.

This new edition is some three hundred pages longer than the first (published in 1936). The selections are each long enough so that the reader can follow a philosophical argument to its conclusion or see a position expounded fully. Yet the scope of the work is such

that all the major points of Santayana's thought are represented: his moral and social thought, his materialism in the philosophy of nature, his Platonic doctrine of essence, and his theory of "animal faith" in theory of knowledge. Inevitably, there is an element of the arbitrary in choosing selections; Professor Edman has chosen his selctions with sympathetic understanding.

The introductory essay presents Santayana's position fully and sympathetically. There is very little attempt at criticism, except of Santayana's preference of the aristocratic form of social organization.

———. *Three Philosophical Poets, Lucretius, Dante, Goethe.* "Anchor Books." Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1953. Pp. 191. 65¢

SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL. *Existential Psychoanalysis.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. $4.75.

SMITH, NORMAN KEMP. *New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. $5.00.

SMITH, RAYMOND. *Whitehead's Concept of Logic.* Westminster: Newman Press, 1953. $3.00.

SNELL, BRUNO. *The Discovery of the Mind. The Greek Origins of European Thought.* Tr. by T. G. Rosenmeyer. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. xii + 324. $5.50.

This book consists of essays by a prominent classical scholar. It deals with subjects like the development of the Greek idea of man; the increasing awareness of individuality in lyric poetry; the origins of science, logic, philosophy; Greek theories of literary criticism. The essays are erudite, yet of broad humanistic interest, and they are excellently translated.

The author seems to have a general underlying position of a very dubious nature. He leaves the impression that primitive man did not know he was an individual distinct from his fellows, could not distinguish between fact and fiction, had no awareness of morality, was incapable of universalization. The human mind, in other words, is a product of civilization. Now, it is quite true that the uncultured and unreflective man tends toward materialism in his implicit metaphysics and toward hedonism in his implicit ethics. But a culture can rise above these limitations only because man had from the beginning the power of reason. Failure to distinguish between the power of reason and its exercise seems to have led Doctor Snell into his ambiguous position. Furthermore, his methodology has its limitations: literary products are not the only things which reveal the humanity of man. The anthropologists provide a useful complement in their emphasis on tools, graphic arts, and social living.

SPIER, J. M. *What Is Calvinistic Philosophy?* Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1953. $1.50.

STEVENS, DAVID H. *Changing Humanities: An Appraisal of Old Values and New Uses.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. $4.00.

STRAUSS, LEO. *Natural Right and History.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. $5.00.

TAYLOR, HAROLD. *On Education and Freedom.* New York: Henry Schuman, 1953. $3.50.

[THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.] *The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas.* Ed. with an introd. by Dino Bigongiari. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1953. Pp. xxxviii + 217. $2.50; Paper, $1.25.

The selections here edited are taken from the *Summa Theologiae* and *On Kingship,* according to the best existing translations. The editor has taken selections from the *Summa* which deal with law, right,

justice, injustice, sedition, and obedience. From *On Kingship* he has taken the first six and the tenth chapters. Notes are taken from the editions of the translations. Where the editor has found it necessary to make his own translations, that fact is indicated.

The introduction deals with St. Thomas's ideas of the state as a natural order, the public power (considering both the ruler and the law), forms of government, and the *plenitudo potestatis*. It is carefully done and well documented. The book is a valuable contribution both to political theory and to the philosophy of St. Thomas.

Tulane Studies in Philosophy. Vol. II. New Orleans: Tulane Univ. Bookstore, 1953. Pp. 122. Paper, $2.00.

This group of essays by members of the Department of Philosophy at Tulane University touches on a variety of subjects. Two of the articles touch on logical points: Harold N. Lee gives an epistemological analysis of induction; Louise N. Roberts treats of a late medieval logical paradox. The remaining articles are in the field of metaphysics. Carl H. Hamburg shows that philosophy cannot adequately be considered to be merely linguistic analysis. Robert Whittemore studies the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz. James K. Feibleman tries to show that Aristotle had a "finite ontology" (in Professor Feibleman's own special sense). Richard L. Barber takes up the diversity problem in philosophy and religion, using an odd definition of faith in his discussion. Edward G. Ballard shows that there is such a thing as an intellectual or rational knowledge of value.

VEBLEN, THORSTEIN. *Theory of the Leisure Class.* "Mentor Books." New York: New American Lib. of World Literature, 1953. 35¢

VIERECK, PETER. *Dream and Responsibility: Four Test Cases of the Tension between Poetry and Social Ethics.* "University Chapbook." Washington, D. C.: Univ. Press of Washington, 1953. $1.50; $1.00.

VON HILDEBRAND, DIETRICH. *The New Tower of Babel.* New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1953. Pp. 243. $3.00.

This collection of essays has little unity except the author's vivid presentation and the recurrence of basic themes. The title essay is a criticism of modern thought. There are two essays on the search for truth, one critical ("The Dethronement of Truth"), the other positive ("Catholicism and Unprejudiced Knowledge"). Two other essays attack "functionalism" and "efficiency" or "professionalism"—much in the vein of the Continental attacks on *l'esprit de métier*. The remaining two essays deal with topics—reverence and beauty—which are similar to the themes on which the author has written some of his most eloquent pages.

WEAVER, RICHARD M. *Ethics of Rhetoric.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953. $3.50.

WELLS, HARRY K. *Pragmatism: Philosophy of U. S. Imperialism.* New York: International Pubns.; Jan., 1954. $3.00.

WHITE, NORTON (ed.). *Academic Freedom, Logic, and Religion.* Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1953. $2.75.

[WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH.] *Alfred North Whitehead.* An anthology. Selected by F. S. C. Northrop and Mason W. Gross. New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. Pp. 928. $12.50.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG. *Philosophical Investigations.* Tr. from the German by G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. Pp. 484. $6.00.

WOODRING, PAUL. *Let's Talk Sense about Our Schools.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953. Pp. 224. $3.50.

WRIGHT, WALTER FRANCIS. *Art and Substance in George Meredith.* Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press. Pp. 218. $3.75.

ZENKOVSKY, V. V. *A History of Russian Philosophy.* Tr. from the Russian by George L. Kline. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1953. 2 vols. Pp. 1068. $15.00.

BOOKS RECEIVED

ALBERT, ETHEL M.; DENISE, THEODORE C.; and PETERFREUND, SHELDON P. *Great Traditions in Ethics: An Introduction.* New York: American Book Co., 1953. Pp. xiv + 362. $4.25.

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